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Abstract
This thesis seeks to gain a deeper understanding of public good production in
developmental settings. This thesis comprises of five chapters. The first chap-
ter provides an introduction and a literature review to build a case for further
studies in public good production in general and disease elimination as a public
good.
Chapter 2 and 3 study two different public good production games. They
both provide some insights into the understanding not only of rabies elimi-
nation, which is the focus of the experimental part of this thesis, but also on
public good production in general. I then discuss policy implications from these
results.
Chapter 4 provides a report on the result of a field experiment conducted in
the Morogoro Rural District of Tanzania. We tested two interventions, namely
mobile phone text messaging and religious/tribal leaders advertising in raising
participation in rabies vaccination campaigns. Results from the experiment
show no evidence that each intervention was effective on their own, but they
were effective when implemented together. We also found suggestive evidence
that operational changes, designed to ease participation, could potentially have
a much larger positive impact on participation than the interventions. We then
discuss some contextual factors that could explain these results. Chapter 5 con-
cludes.
i
Contents
1 Introduction and Literature Review 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Infectious Diseases and Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Rabies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Economic Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.2 Basic Epidemiology of Rabies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.3 Elimination of Rabies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Disease Elimination and Public Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Attention Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Signalling in Threshold Public Good Game 19
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Agents’ Decision Problem at t = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 Policy-maker’s Decision Problem at t = 1 . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Equilibrium Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.1 Tracing Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.2 Stochastic Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.1 Key Implications of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.2 Policy-Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ii
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7.2 Equilibrium Selection: Stochastic Stability . . . . . . . . 39
3 Public Good Game with Incomplete Information and the Dy-
namic of its Production Function 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.1 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2 S-shape Production Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Implications and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5.1 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5.2 Welfare and Policy Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.3 Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7.1 Dynamic of the Left-hand Side of (3.3) . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7.2 Proof of Unique Equilibrium when P (.) is Convex . . . . 67
3.7.3 Set of Equilibria when P (.) is a Step Function . . . . . . 68
3.7.4 Production Function Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4 Raising Participation in Rabies Vaccination Campaigns: Evi-
dence from Tanzania 76
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.1 Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2.3 Pre-Intervention Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
iii
4.2.4 Advertising Interventions and Other Advertisement . . . 85
4.2.5 Vaccination Campaigns and Post-Campaign Activities . 87
4.2.6 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4.1 The Effect of the Advertising Interventions . . . . . . . . 96
4.4.2 The Effect of the Operational Changes . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.6.1 Workshop Discussions: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.6.2 Topic Guide for Focus Group Discussions . . . . . . . . . 110
4.6.3 Discussion topic in Community Leaders workshop . . . . 111
4.6.4 Village-Level Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6.5 Household Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.6.6 Tables Summarising the Number of Interviewees Exposed
to Different Information Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.6.7 Cash Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5 Conclusion 145
iv
List of Tables
4.1 Village-Level Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2 One-tail paired t-tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3 Regression Results Across Different Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4 Number of interviewees exposed to different advertising methods
based on household questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.5 Number of interviewees exposed to different advertising methods
based on vaccination point questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
v
List of Figures
1.1 Herd Immunity (Source: Fine et al., (2011)) . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Reasons for not participating (Source: Bardosh et al., (2014)) . 12
3.1 Equilibrium for concave P (.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2 Equilibrium for convex P (.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Equilibria when P (.) is a step-function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Threshold Equilibria for convex P (.) and θ3 > θ2 > θ1 > 1 . . . 58
3.5 Threshold Equilibria for step P (.), j˜ = n− 1, θ1 = 1 and θ2 > 1 58
3.6 Change in equilibria in relation to θ for concave and convex P (.) 62
3.7 Shape of Rabies Elimination Production Function Based on Dif-
ferent Consolidation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1 Mapping of Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Estimated Vaccination Coverage by Experimental Group . . . . 96
4.3 Estimated Mean Vaccination Coverage Across Years . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Number of villages succeeding or failing in the cash experiment . 143
4.5 Number of villages by number of participants returning the 5,000
TZS cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.6 Scatter plot: Number of participants and vaccination coverage . 144
vi
Acknowledgement
I thank my family for their support throughout the Ph.D. Their support has
been the sources of comfort necessary throughout this process.
I thank my supervisors, Professor Sayantan Ghosal, Dr. Katie Hampson and
Dr. Tiziana Lembo. Their patience, understanding and kindness have been
crucial to the completion of this thesis. Their support, even through my per-
sonal difficulties, have been of utmost importance. Their insights and wisdom
have influenced me beyond the course of the Ph.D. It has been an honour being
their student.
I thank the University of Glasgow for providing me with the Lord Kelvin/Adam
Smith Ph.D scholarship, which has funded my research and my study. I also
thank the Global Challenges Research Fund for funding the field experiment.
Without their generous contribution, we would not have been able to conduct
the experiment as smoothly as we did.
I thank my colleague Joel Changalucha for his help during my field experi-
ment. His assistance, patience and skills have been of utmost importance to
the completion of the experiment. I thank my whole research team in Tanzania
and other colleagues in the Ifakara Health Institute, Tanzania, for their help in
the experiment and for making my stay in Tanzania very comfortable. I would
like to especially mention my gratefulness for Denis Saanane, a vaccinator in
the field experiment, who died in a tragic accident.
I thank my other colleagues at the Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health and
Comparative Medicine (IBAHCM), University of Glasgow: Dr. Paul Johnson,
Professor Louise Matthews, Maganga Sambo and Rachel Steenson for their ad-
vice and help.
vii
I thank my Ph.D colleagues: Prateek Chandra Bhan, Hualin Li, Moritz Mosen-
hauer, Li Nie, Arsenii Paramonov, Jerome Santoul, Damiano Turchet and
Elizaveta Victorova, for their patience in listening to and discussing my work
and for their valuable feedback.
I thank: Sunsey Sereivorleak, Lisa Bland, Ronald & Illinor Douglas, Rah-
mat Karimi, Callum Lawson, Sara Li, Jun Rong Liaw (Jeffrey), Gil & Coralee
Maxwell, Sydney May, Ailsa McLaughlin, Sarah Olsen, Lindsay Rodenkirchen,
Maja Tacchi, Andy & Carol Thomson and Calum Whytock. Time spent with
them provided comfort and joy that I needed through my periods of personal
difficulties.
viii
Author’s Declaration
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of
others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been
submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other In-
stitution.
The copyright of the content of this thesis belongs to the author. No quotation
from it should be published in any format without appropriate acknowledge-
ment.
Putthi Cheat Lim
Glasgow, September 30, 2019
ix
Statement of Conjoint Work
I confirm that Chapter 4,“Raising Participation in Rabies Vaccination Cam-
paigns: Evidence from Tanzania”, was jointly co-authored with Professor Sayan-
tan Ghosal, Doctor Katie Hampson, Doctor Tiziana Lembo and Joel Changalucha.
Putthi Cheat Lim
Glasgow, September 30, 2019
x
Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature
Review
1.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to build a case for the studies conducted in this thesis.
The ultimate goal of this study is to increase voluntary participation in public
good production, specifically rabies elimination in marginalised communities.
In this thesis, I try to understand why there has been low participation in rabies
vaccination campaigns and design interventions to increase voluntary partici-
pation. We have two hypotheses on why this has been the case. Firstly, rabies
elimination is a public good and therefore is likely subject to collective action
problem. Secondly, in developmental settings, participation in rabies elimina-
tion can potentially be a costly activity and it has been unable to capture the
attention of potential participants, who have other important tasks to complete.
The next section briefly explains the role that infectious diseases play in the
prevalence of poverty and how their elimination can help alleviate poverty. Sec-
tion 3 presents the economic burden of rabies on the poor, argues why we focus
on mass dog vaccination rather than other methods as a means for eliminating
rabies and presents some previous studies on canine rabies vaccination. Section
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4 discusses some previous studies on public good production, the relevance of
rabies elimination as a public good and some theoretical studies on vaccination
in game theoretic settings. Section 5 discusses how the lack of attention paid
to rabies elimination could have caused low participation. Section 6 concludes
by giving a brief summary of how these issues motivated the studies in this
thesis.
1.2 Infectious Diseases and Poverty
Infectious diseases pose a major problem for the poor, who are most vulnerable,
due to the lack of adequate living standard and proper health care. Similar
to the lack of human capital, education (Santos, 2011) and nutrition (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2011) which push many poor people into a poverty trap, infectious-
disease-based poverty trap may also exist. The lack of basic living standard
in the poor community makes them vulnerable to infectious diseases, which
in turn cause a loss of productivity and capacity to earn income, when such
income is needed to treat the infectious diseases in the first place. An example
of this is shown in a study by Babu et al., (2002) conducted in Orissa, India,
which showed that chronic lymphatic filariasis causes, on average, a loss of 68
working days per year, which is equivalent to 19% of annual working time; this
poses a large burden on the patients and the families of the patients. A report
on infectious diseases and poverty by the World Health Organisation (WHO)
(2012), mentioned that many problems associated with developing countries
only make the problems caused by infectious disease worse for the poor. For
example, the lack of quality health care system in poor communities usually
cause misdiagnosis and mistreatment of diseases, which waste the resources
put forward by poor patients and put their lives at risk. Another example
raised by the report showed how financial burden in searching for treatments
for a patient means that not enough financial resources is being allocated to
other important investments such as, children’s education, the lack of which
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can cause a whole other generation of poverty in the family.
A theoretical model by Bonds et al., (2010) studied, in an epidemiological set-
ting, the existence of poverty trap due to infectious diseases. The underlying
assumption of the model was that the key epidemiological parameters (includ-
ing natural death rate, recovery rate and transmission rate) were determined
by income, which was in turn determined by individual health. Two of the key
variables in their model were income and productivity. They showed that, de-
pending on the level of productivity, there existed an income level, below which
the society converges to a state of high disease prevalence and low income, and
above which the society converges to a state of low disease prevalence and high
income. In addition, they showed that if the level of productivity was high
enough, the society would always converge to the latter state, but if it is too
low, the society would always converge to the former state. In their empirical
study, which looked at the correlation between income and disease burden, us-
ing population-level data over 170 countries, showed that these two variables
negatively affected each other. This result supports the idea that low level of
income makes a person vulnerable to infectious diseases, which in turn affects
the capacity of the person to generate income and hence, cause a poverty trap.
Zoonotic infectious diseases are diseases that can be transmitted from ani-
mals to humans, for example, rabies (which our research will be focusing on).
Zoonotic diseases account for around 60% of human infectious diseases (Taylor
et al., 2001). Zoonotic diseases not only directly affect the health of those in-
fected, it also affect the productivity and income of the poor, especially those
in the agricultural sector, who depend on livestocks as a source of income. In
spite of this, some zoonotic diseases have been largely overlooked and neglected,
unlike other infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (WHO,
2006), which are seen by governments and funders as posing larger immedi-
ate problems. However, it has to be made aware that zoonotic diseases, as in
3
examples given above, can also pose a large daily economic burden on the poor.
The elimination of zoonotic diseases can be a great opportunity to contribute
to lifting the poor out of poverty. Firstly, like other infectious diseases, suc-
cessful elimination means that the poor are less at risk of spending time being
ill and unproductive. Having an ill person in a family, not only reduce the
patient’s productivity, but also that of the person who has to look after the
patient and accompany them to the hospital. This means a potential increase
in productivity and income if a disease is eliminated. Secondly, it may also
alleviate the psychological burden on the poor, which may have a harmful af-
fect on their productivity. For example, a person bitten by a dog and cannot
afford post-exposure-prophylaxis, may spend a lot of their mental effort worry-
ing about whether they are at risk of contracting rabies. Thirdly, less income
has to be allocated to paying for treatments of diseases and more can be al-
located to investment, such as education of children and other assets. The
WHO (2006) reported that the cost of treatment for rabies is around US$75
for post-exposure prophylaxis (this may be higher for those who live in remote
regions with difficult access to hospitals). This accounts for a large fraction
of the annual income for many in the developing world. Lastly, cost-effective
control measures of some of the zoonotic diseases have already been identified
and successfully implemented in other parts of the world. For example, evi-
dence from the western world showed that rabies can be eliminated through
mass dog vaccination. The report by WHO (2006) showed that estimated costs
per disability adjusted life year (DALY) averted for zoonotic diseases such as
rabies, brucellosis and echinococcosis are less than US$20, which is very low
compared to the annual productivity of a potentially infected person.
As described earlier, neglect and prioritisation of other diseases is a barrier
to the elimination of zoonotic diseases. Therefore, there is a need to find an
economically sustainable way of controlling these diseases.
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1.3 Rabies
Rabies is one of the most feared zoonotic diseases that can infect human
through exposure to the saliva of infected mammals. If a person is exposed
and post-exposure-prophylaxis (PEP) is not administered properly, the person
can contract rabies and once the symptoms arise, there is almost no chance of
the person surviving the disease. A study by Hampson et al., (2015) estimated
that rabies causes around 59,000 human deaths annually, a lot of which, occurs
in developing countries. It should also be noted that reported death figures
are usually thought to be largely underestimated by many studies, since some
victims were not able to report their cases to hospitals and die at home, and
also due to weak surveillance system. This section explains the economic costs
of rabies, which provides the motivation to eliminate the disease, and argues
for the possibility of the elimination of rabies in developing countries through
mass dog vaccination campaigns.
1.3.1 Economic Costs
According to an estimation by Hampson et al., (2015), the global annual cost of
rabies is estimated to be around US$ 8.6 billion. This figure takes into account
productivity losses from premature deaths, direct expenditure on PEP, loss in
income while seeking PEP, loss in livestocks due to rabies and the cost of dog
vaccination and population management. Such large amount of cost should
never be a burden on anyone, especially the poor, who have little ability to
cope in the first place. Such lost is highly regrettable since we have understood
the way to eliminate rabies and we have seen successful elimination of the dis-
ease in the developed world already.
One of the measurements of the burden of rabies is the disability-adjusted
life year (DALY), which is defined as the number of years of productivity loss
due to induced sickness, disability or death. The report by the WHO (2013)
5
also reported that, in Africa alone, rabies caused a loss of 609,000 DALYs in
2010. This is supported in a study by Sambo et al., (2013), which showed that,
in four districts in Tanzania, 78% of the deaths from rabies involved children
less than 16 years old. The same study also showed that 86% of the deaths
from rabies occurred in subsistence farming families. These unnecessary losses
in DALYs is a burden, especially, on the rural families, whose survival relies on
the physical labour of each member of their families.
The monetary costs of rabies also impose a great burden on the poor. The
largest monetary burden is the cost of seeking PEP, which is vital to prevent
a bite victim from contracting rabies, once exposed to the disease. The same
study by Sambo et al., (2013) reported that, some families had to pay between
US$40-50 just for indirect costs of PEP alone (this includes the travel cost to
and from the hospital, accommodation, communication, the loss of productiv-
ity, etc); this is equivalent to almost 20% of average annual income in rural
Tanzania. These indirect costs were made worse by the unavailability of PEP
and the distance of most of the victims from the nearest hospital. 40% of the
patients studied, most of which from the rural area, had to visit up to 5 hos-
pitals to receive PEP. Only 39% of the victims living more than 10 kilometres
away from the district hospital received PEP within 7 days. Distance from the
nearest hospital makes it particularly difficult for the rural victims to receive
the appropriate treatment. It is reported that 78% of the deaths from rabies
occurred in areas more than 10 kilometres away from the hospital. The study
also estimated that the cost of a 5-dose regimen of PEP could cost up to more
than US$100 for a rural Tanzanian. Because of this, not many bite victims
were able to receive a full PEP regimen, if any, and more than half of those
reported the cost of the vaccine as the main reason for this.
Due to the high cost of PEP as a method of preventing human deaths from
rabies and its shortage in the rural area, mass dog vaccination (which will be
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discussed later) has been proposed by some studies (for example, Fitzpatrick
et al., (2014)), as a cost-effective way of preventing human deaths from rabies.
If the mass dog vaccination campaigns are successful, which has been proven to
be possible through the experience of many developed countries, rabies would
be eliminated and the rural communities no longer have to live under fear and
the economic burden of rabies.
1.3.2 Basic Epidemiology of Rabies
A key epidemiological parameter of any infectious disease, such as rabies, is
the reproductive number (R0). Hampson et al., (2009) estimated that the re-
productive number of rabies in dogs is no more than two, which means that on
average, a rabid dog infects no more than two dogs over their life time. Most
estimates placed the reproductive number of rabies just above 1, which is the
threshold, below which, the disease will die out by itself. This figure can be
reduced below the extinction threshold by reducing the number of susceptible
dogs. This can be done through mass dog vaccination, which can induce herd
immunity.
Herd immunity plays a major role in the elimination of rabies by providing
indirect protection to unprotected population, provided a certain threshold of
vaccination coverage is met. Figure 1.1 (from Fine et al., (2011)) provides
an intuitive explanation of how herd immunity works. The upper diagram (A)
shows a situation where there is no immunization whatsoever in the population.
In this case, with the reproductive number of 4, the first individual infects four
other individuals, who each then infects four other individuals, and everyone in
the environment is infected. In the lower diagram (B), where 75% of the indi-
viduals in stage 1 and stage 2 are immunised, only one of the four unimmunised
is infected, unlike in the first case, where every unimmunised node is infected.
In this case, each case causes only one successful transmission. If a slightly
greater proportion of the population is immune, the number of incidence will
7
Figure 1.1: Herd Immunity (Source: Fine et al., (2011))
reduce over time to zero. This shows that it is not necessary to achieve full
vaccination coverage to eliminate rabies. However, a certain coverage threshold
has to be met so that herd immunity can play its part. Fine (1993) provides
an expression for the threshold for herd immunity in terms of the reproductive
number R0 as 1− 1/R0.
Given the reproductive number of rabies just above one, dog populations can
achieve herd immunity, if the critical vaccination threshold, which is estimated
to be between 20% and 45% of the population (Hampson et al., 2009), is met.
This means that only 20% to 45% of the population need to be immune to
rabies for the whole population to be protected from rabies. However, below
this rate, rabies transmission and outbreaks may persist. Due to the demog-
raphy of the dog population (births of new susceptible pups and deaths of
vaccinated dogs, which reduce the coverage rate over time), it has been recom-
mended by several studies (for example Hampson et al., (2009) and Fitzpatrick
et al., (2014)) that annual vaccination campaigns should achieve at least 70%
coverage so that the proportion of vaccinated dogs does not fall below the crit-
ical vaccination threshold. Studies (such as by Coleman and Dye (1996)) have
shown that annual vaccination campaigns that achieve the recommended 70%
have been largely successful at controlling the spread of rabies. However, not
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all vaccination campaigns achieved this target, and this left pockets of infected
dog populations which can present a risk to other populations.
What these epidemiological parameters show is that rabies is clearly not im-
possible to be eliminated, especially when compared to other diseases, which
have been successfully eliminated. There also exists clear evidence from many
developed countries that rabies elimination is possible. This means that the
fact that many people are dying from rabies every year and the burden that it
puts on the poor is highly regrettable. This motivates this research.
1.3.3 Elimination of Rabies
Many methods have been used to control rabies in the dog population, includ-
ing dog culling, sterilisation and vaccination (Knobel et al., 2013). However,
there is no evidence that dog culling and sterilisation by themselves are effective
in eliminating rabies in the long-run and they can also be counter-productive.
Culling is the practice of reducing dog population and hence reduce the number
of potential carriers of rabies. This relies on the concept that reducing the dog
population density will reduce contacts between dogs and hence, the number
of transmissions (Knobel et al., 2013). Even though, this is intuitive, there is
no evidence that transmission of rabies within a dog population is significantly
affected by dog population density (Hampson et al., 2009, Knobel et al., 2013).
Although euthanization of dogs suspected of carrying rabies may be an im-
portant part of rabies control programs, there is no evidence that untargeted
killing of dogs is successful in controlling rabies in the long-run (Knobel et al.,
2013). In addition, such practice is generally considered ethically unacceptable
because it means there is a risk of killing uninfected dogs. In addition, the
killing of dogs may cause shortage of the supply of dogs. This means that
dogs have to be imported to satisfy the demand and this may mean bringing
in more infected dogs into the local population. Therefore, the risk of rabies
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still persists.
Sterilisation of dogs depends on the same concept and has the same prob-
lem as the culling of dogs. The insignificant effect of dog population density
on the reproductive number, means that sterilisation should have little affect
on the transmission of rabies. The resulting shortage of supply of dogs in the
local population means more dogs have to be imported to satisfy local demand.
Therefore, even if the local sterilized population is free from rabies, if any of
the imported dogs are infected, rabies transmission will occur again. However,
it should also be noted that a combination of sterilisation and mass dog vacci-
nation has been shown to be successful (Reece and Chawla, 2006).
Mass dog vaccination is a widely accepted means of eliminating rabies and
it has been proven to be an effective way for long-term control of rabies. This
strategy does not come with the same problems as culling and sterilisation by
themselves. However, this does not mean that it does not have its own prob-
lems. Problems with the implementation of vaccination policies range from
the top level to the low level. At the top level, being one of the neglected
tropical diseases, rabies is largely neglected by many governments. Most gov-
ernments of the developing countries, due to their limited resources, choose to
allocate most of their resources on other competing health issues instead. At
the low level, there are issues ranging from the organisation of the vaccination
campaigns to participation from the communities. Our research is interested
in issues at the low level, particularly, the problem of raising awareness and
encouraging participation from local communities.
Although mass dog vaccination campaigns have been shown to be potentially
effective in controlling rabies, the delivery of the campaigns must meet two
criteria. Firstly, it must be sustainable in the sense that it can be implemented
at low costs, so that the vaccination campaigns can be carried out regularly
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with low budgetary requirement. At the same time it must guarantee the high-
est chance of success. Kaare et al., (2009) studied different strategies for the
delivery of the campaigns. They showed that house-to-house vaccination was
effective, but costly. On the other hand, the central point strategy, in which
villagers had to bring their dogs to a vaccination point for vaccination, was
much less costly, but achieved lower vaccination coverage. This was driven by
the lack of active participation by community members. If rabies elimination is
to be sustained in the long-term, we need a less costly strategy like the central
point strategy, but it needs to be much more effective.
Bardosh et al., (2014) conducted an anthropological study relating to local
attitudes towards dog vaccination in Kilombero and Ulanga district in Tanza-
nia, to understand the lack of active participation from community members in
rabies vaccination campaigns. Figure 1.2 (from Bardosh et al., 2014) provides
some of the reported reasons for not participating. Almost a quarter of those
who failed to vaccinate their dogs, reported not being aware of vaccination
campaigns as the main reason. Gaps in information dissemination may explain
the lack of awareness, but limited attention and cognitive capacity, seen by
some empirical studies in some poor populations, can make the problem even
worse. Other reported reasons such as having the central point too far, unable
to find or catch dogs may be partially explained by their lack of commitment.
In addition, the study also reported that some members of the communities
did not think that they were at risk from rabies. Therefore, raising awareness
of the risk and the cost of rabies should be part of the solution to this problem
because as people are more aware of the risk and cost of rabies, they would
pay more attention to protecting themselves against rabies and the problems
discussed earlier would be resolved.
The study also reported that members of the communities believed that no
more than half of the dog population is vaccinated. They believed that there
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Figure 1.2: Reasons for not participating (Source: Bardosh et al., (2014))
were fewer responsible than irresponsible dog owners, who did not take care of
their dogs very well, which facilitated the spread of the disease. This perception
might have le some to think that vaccinating their dogs cannot reduce their
risk of contracting rabies enough to worth the opportunity costs of doing so.
This was because their participation is perceived to be worthless as they would
not be able to reach the 70% threshold. This result is a suggestive evidence
of an underlying collective action problem. This problem is typically seen in
public good production problems, where each individual would not participate
in the production of the public good if they think that their participation has
little effect on the production of the public good. In this sense, the elimination
of rabies can be considered as a public good. This problem will be discussed
further in the next section.
1.4 Disease Elimination and Public Good
As discussed above, the elimination of any disease is a public good in the sense
that once any disease is eliminated everyone benefits and it requires partici-
pation from many individuals. Therefore, the study of disease elimination can
reasonably be placed in the context of public good production and deserves the
same focus on dealing with collective action problem.
12
There have been only a few known literatures on vaccination in a game the-
oretic setting. Bauch and Earn (2004) and Poletti et al., (2012) studied the
effect of risk perception on vaccination uptake in an epidemiological setting.
The model by Bauch and Earn (2004) showed that in equilibrium, vaccina-
tion level is higher if the perceived risk of infection is increased. Poletti et al.,
(2012) studied a more general model on how people take cautionary actions in
response to changes in their risk perceptions. They showed that people tend to
take more cautionary actions, which include reducing contacts or taking vacci-
nation, if the perceived risks of infection is higher.
Brito et al., (1991) studied the affect of vaccination policies at a macro-level.
Specifically, they compared the outcome of different vaccination policies: free-
choice, compulsory vaccination and subsidies and taxation. They showed that
there exists a threshold of cost of vaccination, such that those whose cost is
below the threshold will vaccinate and those whose cost is higher than the
threshold will not vaccinate. They also showed that the free-choice policy is
superior in terms of social welfare to compulsory vaccination. However, the
free-choice policy cannot reach the optimum level of vaccination. The intuition
behind this is that, by imposing compulsory vaccination, those with high costs
of vaccination are forced to incur the high costs, even though in the free-choice
policy, they could have benefited from partial protection (from other vacci-
nated individuals) without having to incur the costs. They also showed that
the socially optimum level of vaccination can be reached by subsidising the
vaccinated and taxing the unvaccinated.
Although the results by Brito et al.(1991) showed that taxation and subsidi-
sation can achieve the optimum level of vaccination, it’s applicability in the
case of rabies elimination is questionable. Firstly, it may not be practical to
collect the information about who vaccinated their dogs and who did not. Sec-
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ondly, such policy requires a lot of attention from the governments, of which
rabies, as one of the neglected tropical diseases, has little. Thirdly, the costs
of such policy may far outweigh the revenue from taxation and since rabies is
a disease that harms the poor the most, taxing the poor who do not vaccinate
their dogs may make their situation even worse. Fourthly, subsidisation can
be costly and may not be sustainable in the long-run. Subsidisation by pro-
viding free vaccines have been shown to be ineffective in contexts where other
participation costs of participants are high (Kaare et al., 2009). In addition,
even if subsidisation, in general, can induce greater participation, it means that
the participation is driven by financial factors that cannot be sustained in the
long-run without continued financial support. For these reasons, our research
focuses on a different set of interventions which induces voluntary participation.
Both theoretical and empirical literature on voluntary contribution mechanisms
in public goods have provided some useful insights into factors that affect vol-
untary contribution. Green and Laffont (1977) and Groves and Looeb (1975)
showed in a theoretical analysis that communication of true preferences can
improve participation in public good production. Isaac and Walker (1988a)
showed, in an experiment, that group size had little effect on participation in
public good production and that what mattered more was the marginal return
of one’s contribution to the public good. Isaac and Walker (1988b) showed,
in another experiment, that non-binding communication lead to a decrease in
free-riding behaviour and an increase in the provision of a public good. Croson
et al., (2005) showed that reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation are
present in the behaviour of participants in public goods game. Experiments in
the public good literature are mostly under laboratory conditions. Alston and
Nowell (1996) questioned the applicability of voluntary contribution mecha-
nism, studied in laboratory conditions, in natural settings. These experimental
literatures provide some useful insights by identifying selected social factors
which are mechanisms through which participation can increase. The experi-
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mental part of my thesis is focused on a field experiment that takes place in a
real world situation. This slightly differs from the literatures discussed above
because the social factors described above are all likely to be present to some
extent. Therefore, instead of looking at specific mechanisms that are likely to
induce participation, my study is more focused on designing general policies
that can overcome collective action problem given those mechanisms.
In many cases, collective action problem in disease elimination is overcome
through the private benefit of vaccination itself. For many diseases, the direct
private benefit of vaccination typically outweighs the cost of vaccination be-
cause vaccination provides complete protection to those who vaccinate. The
main reason for many people to vaccinate against diseases such as smallpox
was that it gave them protection against the deadly disease. The elimination
of smallpox was just an externality of a high level of participation. Zoonotic
diseases, such as rabies, does not have this advantage. Rabies vaccination may
provide a small marginal private benefit to individuals by protecting their dogs
against the deadly disease, but the individuals are still susceptible to being in-
fected by other dogs. This makes the elimination of rabies and other zoonotic
diseases much more prone to collective action problem than other diseases. For
this reason, in this thesis, I try to understand the lack of participation in ra-
bies vaccination campaigns in a public good setting, with discussions on how to
overcome collective action problem by trying to induce voluntary participation.
1.5 Attention Allocation
As discussed above, the problem of rabies elimination is generally set in rural
communities, where community members tend to be poor and marginalised.
One of our working hypotheses, is that the poor have many important daily
tasks that compete for their attention, and in most cases, they would pay most
attention to tasks that affect their immediate and short-term needs such as
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grazing their livestock, making money and finding food, and they would pay
less attention to less immediate needs with long-term benefits such as vacci-
nating their dogs. We believe that this, at least partially, explains the lack of
participation in rabies vaccination campaigns.
Kahneman (1973) provided a theory of limited capacity of attention. In his
argument, individuals have only a limited amount of attention that are then al-
located to specific tasks. Tasks that receive sufficient attention are performed
and completed well. Tasks that do not receive sufficient attention are com-
pleted with lower quality or does not get completed at all. This is because
when insufficient attention is given to the task, signals or relevant information
related to the task are neglected or undetected because not enough attention
was allocated to the task. In the case of rabies elimination, the immediate im-
portance of many daily tasks put a strain on attention allocated to long-term
benefits such as rabies vaccination and elimination.
Empirical studies such as by Mani et al., (2013) and Shah et al., (2012) showed
that the effect of limited capacity of attention on the poor is real. Mani et al.,
(2013) showed that financial burdens harm the cognitive ability of the poor
far more than that of the rich. They showed that the poor performed a lot
worst than the rich in experimental tasks even if they put as much or even
more effort. Shah et al., (2012) showed that the poor tend to focus too much
on some problems and neglect other equally or even more important problems.
This behaviour explained how the poor tend to engage in over-borrowing by
borrowing at excessively high interest rates because they focused too much on
achieving short-term liquidity at the expense of future financial well-being.
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) provided a theoretical study on allocation
of attention. They studied a case where an individual has to decide to pay
attention to problems at home or at work. They showed that individuals with
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high productivity would allocate their full attention to problems at work, while
those with low productivity would allocate their full attention to problems at
home. The intuition here is that for individuals with high productivity, allocat-
ing full attention to problems at work would provide enough compensation to
offset their problems at home. On the other hand, those with low productivity
find it optimal to allocate attention to their problems at home because even
if they allocate full attention to problems at work, it would not be enough to
offset their problems at home. The decision to vaccinate against rabies in rural
settings may suffer from the same problem. It is may be of more short-term
benefit to perform daily income-generating tasks than to vaccinate one’s dogs.
Therefore, many people with immediate short-term needs would allocate their
full attention to the former rather than the latter task. In the context of rabies
elimination in developing countries, where many have reasons to pay attention
to their immediate needs, such present-bias can be a significant factor driving
the low vaccination coverage.
For this reason, we believe that any interventions that are effective in raising
participation in canine rabies vaccination campaigns need to be informative
and make salient the importance of rabies elimination and the risk that rabies
pose to the livelihood of each community. We believe also that the interven-
tions need to be direct, in the sense that it does not require too much attention
from those exposed the interventions to notice and remember what they learn
from them.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that infectious diseases pose an unnecessary economic
burden on the marginalised communities. The elimination of some of those
diseases have been proven to be possible and would be very beneficial to those
communities. Failure to eliminate infectious diseases stem from many differ-
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ent factors. In this research, we only focus on voluntary participation, which
has been a significant contributing factor to the failure of rabies vaccination
campaigns. It has been hypothesised that the failure of local community mem-
bers to voluntarily participate in the vaccination campaigns is due to two key
factors: collective action problem and the failure to pay attention to rabies
elimination.
In the following chapters, I try to understand this problem and derive policy
implications from two different game theoretic models. I then test the effec-
tiveness of two interventions designed to overcome both collective action and
attention problem: the use of mobile phone text messaging and religious/tribal
leaders in mobilising participation in canine rabies vaccination campaigns in
the Morogoro Rural district of Tanzania.
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Chapter 2
Signalling in Threshold Public
Good Game
2.1 Introduction
Olson (1965) argued that even if a group can work together to achieve a com-
mon interest, rational and self-interested individuals would not always act to
achieve the common good. However, many public goods require voluntary
contributions from many of its beneficiaries to be produced. Many economic
literatures, such as by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Medina (2007), showed
the persistence of the free-riding equilibrium where no one cooperates in the
production of public goods, which support Olson’s argument. Many empirical
literatures do not show such extreme result, but they show that under-provision
of public goods is prominent in many contexts.
The production of public goods are important at many levels. At a local level,
people can benefit greatly from public goods, ranging from the construction
and maintenance of infrastructures to the eradication of diseases. At a global
level, examples of public good include the reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and global peace and security.
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A lot of these public goods rely on participation from its beneficiaries to be
produced. A popular way to mobilise participants and to increase demand
for a public good is through public awareness campaigns where an authority or
institution with an interest in a particular public good informs potential partic-
ipants about the benefit of the public good. This can be seen in, for example,
vaccination campaigns (Rabies (Kaare et al., 2009), Pertussis (Clarke et al.,
2015) and childhood diseases (Barham and Maluccio, 2009)) and campaigns to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui, 2009). These type
of awareness-raising campaigns are not as successful as we may want them to
be. Clarke et al., (2015) showed that even though most South Australians being
studied understood the severity of Pertussis, very few were vaccinated against
Pertussis, and increasing awareness about the availability and effectiveness of
vaccines did not increase vaccination coverage to a desirable level. Barham and
Maluccio (2009) showed that an additional intervention, namely conditional
cash transfers, was needed to increase vaccination coverage to a desirable level.
Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui (2009) showed that mass-media campaign in Japan
raises public concern about greenhouse gas emissions for a short period only.
These examples show that not all awareness-raising campaigns succeed at mo-
bilising enough participants for a public good to be produced.
In this chapter, I attempt to understand why such awareness-raising campaigns
do not always work in the context of voluntary participation in public good
production. I do this by analysing a simple threshold public good production
model with interaction between agents and a policy-maker. In my model, a
certain number of agents need to participate in producing the public good for
it to be produced. The policy-maker can send some signal (in the sense of
signalling by Spence (1973)), which may or may not be informative depending
on their strategy, to the agents. In this model, the public good can be of high
or low benefit and I assume that only the policy-maker knows the true type
of the public good. I believe this is a reasonable assumption because in prac-
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tice, there tend to be an institution or an organisation, who are much better
informed than individuals due to their expertise, trying to convince individuals
to contribute to the public good.
The choice to focus on threshold public goods is because they are compara-
ble to disease elimination as a public good, which is the focus of this thesis.
In the context of disease elimination, the threshold of the public good is the
threshold for herd immunity to be achieved. Extensive experimental litera-
tures have looked at mechanisms that can increase participation in threshold
public good. Cadsby and Maynes (1999) showed that money-back guarantee in-
creases participation, higher threshold discourages participation in the absence
of money-back guarantee and higher rewards can increase participation. Marks
and Croson (1998) studied the effect of rebates on participation in threshold
public good production. They showed that rebates can increase participation
if excess contribution is used to provide additional public good. These studies
provide some useful insights into some tools that can be used to increase par-
ticipation in threshold public goods. However, in an uncontrolled environment
such as rabies vaccination, the applicability of these tools is limited. In my
model, I look at how signalling, which is typically used to motivate partici-
pation, actually affects participation in threshold public good production and
what can be done to improve the outcome.
The result of my model shows that the effect of signalling is rather limited.
Signalling or any awareness-raising policy will only go so far as to make an
equilibrium, where the public good is produced, part of the equilibrium set,
but it does not eliminate the free-riding equilibrium from the equilibrium set.
An equilibrium selection argument, namely stochastic stability (Young, 1993)
suggests that the free-riding equilibrium is most likely to prevail. The tracing
procedure (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988), on the other hand, provides conditions
for a desirable equilibrium to be achieved. This suggests that there is an under-
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lying collective action problem and that a good policy should not only target
raising awareness about the benefit of the public good, but it should also target
solving or overcoming collective action problem in some way.
The main contribution of this model is that it adds a designer (or policy-maker)
to a threshold public good game and apply equilibrium selection arguments.
This is particularly relevant in many cases where there usually is a policy-
maker who tries to convince their community members to participate in public
good production. The result of this model explains and provides a prediction
of the outcome of their interaction, which can then be used as a guideline for
policy-design.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section
3 analyses the equilibria of the model. Section 4 discusses two different equi-
librium selection arguments, the tracing procedure and stochastic stability. In
section 5, I discuss the implication of the results, some policy implications and
a case study is presented to show the relevance of the model being studied.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section, I describe the main model. I study a three time period (t =
0, 1, 2) model with two types of players, the policy-maker (PM) and a group
of n agents, where N denotes the set of n agents.
I assume that there are only two types of public good, low-benefit, which yields
BL for everyone if produced, or high-benefit, which yields BH , where BH > BL.
The probability that the benefit of the public good is b = BH is P (b = BH) = p
and this is common knowledge. It is assumed that the policy-maker is able to
observe the true type of public good, and they can send some public signal
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s ∈ {sL, sH}, where sL denotes a low-cost signal and sH a high-cost signal.
The agents, on the other hand, do not observe the public good type, but they
rely on the public signal from the policy-maker to update their beliefs about
the benefit of the public good. The agents can then choose whether they want
to participate in the production of the public good. If at least m agents choose
to participate, the public good is produced. It is assumed that m ≤ n.
For simplicity, the pay-off of an agent i is denoted by:
EUi(b, x, s) =
 E(b|s)− γixi if
∑n
j=1 xj ≥ m
−γixi if
∑n
j=1 xj < m
(2.1)
E(b|s) is the agent’s expectation of the public good given the signal s sent by
the policy-maker. xi ∈ {0, 1} denotes the action of agent i, where xi = 1 indi-
cates that agent j participates in the production of the public good and xi = 0
indicates otherwise. x = (x1, ..., xn) denotes the action profile of all agents. γi
denotes the cost that agent i incurs if he chooses to participate. This means
that an agent’s decision whether to participate or not depends only on the
expected net pay-off from doing so.
Similarly, the pay-off of the policy-maker is denoted by:
UPM(b, x, s) =
 b− c(s) if
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ m
−c(s) if∑ni=1 xi < m (2.2)
It is assumed that c(sL) = 0 and c(sH) > 0. The policy-maker’s pay-off func-
tion indicates that the policy-maker is only interested in getting the public
good produced and balancing it with the cost of signalling.
The timing of the game is as follows:
• Time t = 0: Nature chooses the type of public good b ∈ {BL, BH}.
• Time t = 1: The policy-maker observes the type of the public good and
chooses a public signal s ∈ {sL, sH}.
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• Time t = 2: All agents observe the public signal and choose whether to
participate or not in the production of the public good. If at least m
agents choose to participate, the public good is produced and everyone
benefits.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The strategy of agent i
is a pair (xi(sL), xi(sH)), which contains his choice of action as a function of the
observed public signal from the policy-maker. The policy-maker’s strategy is a
pair (s(BL), s(BH)) which indicates the policy-maker’s choice when the public
good is either BL or BH , respectively. I will first study the agents’ decision
problem at t = 2, followed by the policy-maker’s signalling strategy at t = 1.
Throughout this chapter, I assume that if an agent is indifferent between par-
ticipating and not participating, he will always choose to participate.
2.3.1 Agents’ Decision Problem at t = 2
At t = 2, all agents will have observed the public signal from the policy-maker
and will have established their beliefs about the type of the public good. At
this stage, they will play an n-person game among themselves to determine
whether the public good is produced or not.
Within this game, an agent i’s decision depends not only on their expected
value of the public good E(b|s) but also on three possible events:
A :
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj = m− 1
B :
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj < m− 1
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C :
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj ≥ m
Event A indicates that without i’s participation, exactly m − 1 other agents
participate in the production of the public good. In event A, i is the pivotal
agent, because his decision determines whether the public good is produced
or not. In events B or C, on the other hand, i is not the pivotal agent, be-
cause, respectively, the public good is not produced or produced regardless of
i’s action. This means that i’s decision has to take into account the probabil-
ity that each of these events occur. Denote P (e|x−i) as the probability that
event e = A,B or C happens, given the action profile of all agents apart from i.
Given the probability P (e|x−i) and agent i’s expectation of the public good
E(b|s), agent i’s expected payoff from choosing xi = 1 is
EUi(b, (xi = 1, x−i)) = P (A|x−i)(E(b|s)−γi)+P (B|x−i)(−γi)+P (C|x−i)(E(b|s)−γi)
and the agent’s expected payoff from choosing xi = 0 is
EUi(b, (xi = 0, x−i)) = P (A|x−i)(0) + P (B|x−i)(0) + P (C|x−i)E(b|s)
Agent i chooses xi = 1 only if EUi(b, (xi = 1, x−i)) ≥ EUi(b, (xi = 0, x−i):
(P (A|x−i) + P (C|x−i))(E(b|s)− γi)− P (B|x−i)γi ≥ P (C|x−i)E(b|s)
Rearrange:
P (A|x−i) ≥ γi
E(b|s)
From this, we can obtain agent i’s decision rule as follows:
x∗i =
 1 if P (piv|x−i) ≥
γi
E(b|s)
0 if P (piv|x−i) < γiE(b|s)
(2.3)
where P (piv|x−i) = P (A|x−i). Implicitly, condition (2.3) implies that for an
agent to participate in the production of the public good, it must be true that
E(b|s) ≥ γi. According to (2.3), in equilibrium, there are only two possible
responses in pure strategy from the agents to any strategy of the policy-maker,
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either x∗ is such that
∑
i∈N xi = 0 or
∑
i∈N xi = m.
Lemma 1: For some E(b|s) derived from the policy-maker’s signal s, there are
only two possible collective responses from the agents in pure strategy, either∑
i∈N xi = 0 or
∑
i∈N xi = m.
Proof for this result follows directly from the decision rule (2.3). For any
outcome 0 <
∑
i∈N xi < m, all participants are non-pivotal, which contradicts
(2.3). For any outcome
∑
i∈N xi > m, there are
∑
i∈N xi−m participants who
are non-pivotal, which also contradicts (2.3). The outcomes
∑
i∈N xi = 0 and∑
i∈N xi = m are the only outcomes in pure strategy that satisfy (2.3).
From here onwards, I call the outcome, where there is no participation, the
free-riding equilibrium and one, where there is enough participation for the
public good to be produced, a threshold equilibrium. Note that in cases where
γi ≥ E(b|s) for at least m agents, both outcomes can be strict Nash equilibria.
This suggests that there exists an underlying collective action problem in this
setting. The next natural question is which of these equilibria is more likely to
prevail. This will be discussed in the next section.
2.3.2 Policy-maker’s Decision Problem at t = 1
The policy-maker’s strategy will depend on the participation costs of all agents.
To assist in analysing the policy-maker’s decision problem, I introduce addi-
tional notations: M¯ = {i ∈ N : pBH + (1−p)BL ≥ γi}, MLH = {i ∈ N : BH >
BL ≥ γi} and ML = {i ∈ N : BH ≥ γi > BL}.This subsection will identify
conditions under which the policy-maker chooses a pooling strategy or a sepa-
rating strategy. For ease of exposition, I will provide an intuitive explanation
of how the equilibria are derived and I will leave the technical details to the
Appendix for interested readers.
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As explained in the previous subsection, the agents’ response which corre-
sponds to the free-riding equilibrium always exists. In this case, the policy-
maker’s best response is to choose the pooling strategy (sL, sL). This is part
of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium because the free-riding outcome can also be
a best response to (sL, sL). On the other hand, the pooling strategy (sH , sH)
can never be part of an equilibrium, because it is no more informative to the
agents than (sL, sL), which means it should not influence the behaviour of the
agents, therefore the policy-maker will strictly prefer the strategy (sL, sL) to
(sH , sH). The pooling strategy (sL, sL) can also be met with a response where
the public good is produced if |M¯ | ≥ m, which is also an equilibrium.
The separating strategy (sL, sH) can be part of an equilibrium where the
response from the agents is such that exactly m agents choose the strategy
(xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 1). This clearly means that in this equilibrium, it is only
possible to produce BH . This equilibrium holds under two conditions: a) if
c(sH) > BL, and b) if |MLH | ≥ m and |MLH | − |MH | < m. If condition a)
does not hold, the policy-maker would be willing to choose sH when b = BL.
Condition b) means that the production of the public good requires the par-
ticipation of at least some of the agents who are willing to produce BH only
and not BL.
On the other hand, the separating strategy (sH , sL) cannot be part of an equi-
librium. This is because in this model each action by the policy-maker has
no direct influence on the utility of the agents and the policy-maker’s strategy
influences only the beliefs of the agents. Since I am using Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium as the solution concept, the agents’ beliefs and response when the
policy-maker’s strategy (sL, sH) should mirror those of when the policy-maker’s
strategy is (sH , sL). In addition, since it is assumed that c(sH) > c(sL) and
BH > BL, for the strategy (sH , sL) to be feasible for the policy-maker it must
be true that BH > BL > c(sH) > c(sL). If this is true, and given the beliefs
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generated by the strategy (sH , sL), then the policy-maker would choose sL in-
stead of sH when b = BL. Therefore, the separating strategy (sH , sL) cannot
be part of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1: This game has three types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
• There always exists a pooling equilibrium where the policy-maker chooses
(sL, sL) and m agents choose (x
∗
i (sL) = 0, x
∗
i (sH) = 0). This equilibrium
is sustained if the off-equilibrium-path beliefs of more than n−m agents
is such that µ(BH |sH) < γi−BLP (piv|x−i)P (piv|x−i)(BH−BL) .
• If |M¯ | ≥ m, there exists a pooling equilibrium where the policy-maker
chooses (sL, sL) and all agents choose (x
∗
i (sL) = 1, x
∗
i (sH) = 0), if their
off-equilibrium-path beliefs are µ(BH |sH) < γi−BLP (piv|x−i)P (piv|x−i)(BH−BL) , or (x∗i (sL) =
1, x∗i (sH) = 1), if they have off-equilibrium-path beliefs of µ(BH |sH) ≥
γi−BLP (piv|x−i)
P (piv|x−i)(BH−BL) .
• If |MLH | ≥ m, |MLH | − |MH | < m and c(sH) > BL, there exists a sepa-
rating equilibrium where the policy-maker chooses the strategy (sL, sH)
and exactly m agents choose the strategy (x∗i (sL) = 0, x
∗
i (sH) = 1).
2.4 Equilibrium Selection
The equilibrium analysis section above shows that in some settings, there ex-
ist multiple equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria means that these
outcomes are uninformative as it provides little predictive power. Equilibrium
selection arguments, including the tracing procedure (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988) and the concept of stochastic stability (Young, 1993) will be used to
identify which equilibrium is most likely to prevail and the conditions under
which they prevail.
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2.4.1 Tracing Procedure
The tracing procedure is an equilibrium selection method developed by Harsanyi
and Selten (1988). Although the game being studied is not a perfect informa-
tion game, the sub-game played by the n agents, which we are most interested
in, is a perfect information game, taking the agents’ expected value of the pub-
lic good E(b|s) as given.
To apply the tracing procedure in this problem, I introduce additional nota-
tions. Denote Γ as the sub-game played by the n agents. Denote σ = (σ1, ..., σn)
as the mixed strategy profile of all agents where σi denotes the probability that
agent i chooses xi = 1. Denote β = (β1, ..., βn) as the prior strategy combina-
tion which represents the agents’ mutual expectation of each other’s strategies.
Denote β−i = (β1, ..., βi−1, βi+1, ..., βn) as agent i’s subjective belief about the
other agents’ strategies. It is assumed that all βi’s are independent of each
other. The only restriction for β is that all βi can only be convex combinations
of i’s equilibrium strategies1.
Define an auxiliary game, Γλ, where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, as a game where the expected
utility of each agent is as follows:
EUλi (σi, σ−i) = λEUi(σi, σ−i) + (1− λ)EUi(σi, β−i) (2.4)
where
EUi(σi, σ−i) = E(b|s)P (
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ m|σi, σ−i)− γiσi
and
EUi(σi, β−i) = E(b|s)P (
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ m|σi, β−i)− γiσi
P (
∑
i∈N xi ≥ m|σi, σ−i) and P (
∑
i∈N xi ≥ m|σi, β−i) are probabilities that∑
i∈N xi ≥ m given (σi, σ−i) and (σi, β−i) respectively.
1For example, an agent i whose only equilibrium strategy is xi = 0 must have βi = 0.
Whereas, an agent j whose equilibrium strategies consist of both x∗j = 0 and x
∗∗
j = 1 may
have 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1.
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Notice that at λ = 1, the expected utility function (2.4) is synonymous with
the agents’ utility function (2.1), but adapted to allow for mixed strategies. At
λ = 0, each agent’s expected utility relies completely on his own action and his
subjective beliefs β−i about the other agents’ strategies.
In a similar way as we derived the agents’ decision rule (2.3), we can also
derive the agents’ decision rule in the game Γλ as:
σ∗i =
 1 if λPi(piv|σ−i) + (1− λ)Pi(piv|β−i) ≥
γi
E(b|s)
0 if λPi(piv|σ−i) + (1− λ)Pi(piv|β−i) < γiE(b|s)
(2.5)
The tracing procedure begins by studying the agents’ best responses to β at
λ = 0 and how they change as λ increases to 1. The outcome of the tracing
procedure relies heavily on β. Suppose we are in a state where strictly less
than m agents have γi ≤ E(b|s). The only possible outcome is an equilibrium
where all agents choose σ∗i = 0 because the only possible β’s are such that
all agents’ best responses are σ∗(β−i) = 0. Suppose we are in a state where
at least m agents have γi ≤ E(b|s). In this state, it is clear from the defini-
tion of β, that we can always find some β such that at least m agents choose
σ∗i (β−i) = 1. If β is such that exactly m agents choose σ
∗
i (β−i) = 1, the final
outcome will be such that exactly the same m agents choose σ∗i = 1. The result
is more interesting if β is such that more than m agents choose σ∗i (β−i) = 1.
If this is true, this means that for at least some agent i, the probability that
he is pivotal given the strategy of others σ−i must be P (piv|σ−i) = 0. This
is because more than m agents have chosen to participate. Therefore, as λ
increases from 0 to 1, λP (piv|σ−i) + (1− λ)P (piv|β−i) decreases for all agents
who chose σ∗i (β−i) = 1. This means that as λ increases to 1, more and more
agents will change their best responses from σ∗i = 1 to σ
∗
i = 0. This process
continues until only m agents remain, at which point P (piv|σ−i) jumps to 1
and λP (piv|β−i) + (1− λ)P (piv|σ−i) = 1. This leads to the following result:
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Proposition 2.2: For any β such that at least m agents choose σ∗i (β−i) = 1,
the tracing procedure always ends in a threshold equilibrium. Otherwise, it
will always end in the free-riding equilibrium.
Proof : This result follows immediately from the preceding argument.
2.4.2 Stochastic Stability
The equilibrium selection concept, stochastically stable equilibrium (Young,
1993) will be applied here in a similar way as by Ghosal and Proto (2009).
The underlying assumption of this equilibrium selection concept is that when
there are multiple equilibria, players may make mistakes or experiment with
different actions. The stochastically stable equilibrium is one which is most
robust to such mistake or experimentation. It is intuitive that the free-riding
equilibrium is most likely to be most robust to such mistake. The smallest
number of mistakes that it takes to move from the free-riding equilibrium to a
threshold equilibrium is m− 1. This number is required so that there exists at
least one agent whose best response is to participate. However, it needs only
one mistake to move in the opposite direction. This leads to the following result:
Proposition 2.3: The free-riding equilibrium is the stochastically stable equi-
librium if the public good has any threshold m > 2.
Proof : See appendix.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Key Implications of the Results
The results of the analyses above have several important implications. The
first key result is the persistent existence of the free-riding equilibrium. This is
true regardless of the agents’ posterior on the benefit of the public good. This
suggests that it is always possible that there is insufficient voluntary partici-
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pation in the production of the public good even if everyone believes that it is
very beneficial to them. This is consistent with the argument by Olson (1965).
The second key result is that the separating strategy by the policy-maker can
be crucial in allowing the threshold equilibrium to exist, but it does not rule
out the existence of the free-riding equilibrium. This suggests that even if a
policy-maker is able to convince potential participants that the public good
is beneficial to them, there is still a chance that they will collectively fail to
produce the public good. This identifies one key role of the policy-maker as a
conveyor of information. But it also identifies another quality that the policy-
maker and participants need, that is the ability to coordinate collective action.
The third result worth mentioning is the persistent existence of the first type
of equilibrium mentioned in Proposition 2.1, in which the policy-maker chooses
the pooling strategy (sL, sL) and the agents always choose not to participate.
This equilibrium suggests that even if it is crucial to convince participants that
a public good is beneficial, a policy-maker may not even try to do so, if they
think that the participants are not able to coordinate to produce the public
good. This can be seen from two different perspectives. Firstly, it suggests
that if the policy-maker expects that the participants will fail to act collec-
tively, then they won’t even try to convince the participants to participate.
Secondly, if the policy-maker thinks that they themselves do not have the abil-
ity to coordinate collective action among the participants then they won’t even
try to convince the participants. This can be driven by different factors such as
weak social institutions and weak leadership from the side of the policy-maker
that make them unable to coordinate collective action among the participants.
Examples of these are provided in the subsection below.
The fourth result shown in the equilibrium selection argument using the tracing
procedure shows the importance of participants’ prior beliefs over each other’s
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action. One important implication of this result is that as long as participants
believe that others are participating to a high enough probability but not too
high, then we always end in a threshold equilibrium, where the public good
is produced. Note however that the tracing procedure assumes that partici-
pants collectively make decisions by gradually adjusting their beliefs over other
participants’ action. In reality, this may or may not be the case and require
additional experimentation to show if this is the case.
The final result shown was that the free-riding equilibrium is the stochasti-
cally stable equilibrium. This suggests that without any instrument or tool to
coordinate collective action among participants, the production of the public
good will most likely fail. It also suggests that even if it happens that the
threshold equilibrium is selected, it is still likely to diverge to the free-riding
equilibrium if there is nothing to reinforce it.
2.5.2 Policy-Implication
The most important policy-implication from this result is that it is not enough
just for the policy-maker to make salient the benefit of the public good to their
community members or attract their attention, but it is just as, if not more,
important that they ensure that their community members can overcome col-
lective action problem. That is, a community needs strong institutional factors,
whether from within the community itself or from outside, that induce coop-
eration.
This result may explain the inability of communities with weak institutions
to provide public goods. While interventions to inform participants are readily
available in most cases, strong institutions are more difficult to come by, espe-
cially in developing countries (Fiszbein and Lowden (1999)). For this reason, in
responding to the question of who should provide public good, Ghatak (1998)
suggests that rather than delegating this responsibility to local governments,
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the voluntary sector, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should
form partnership with the local governments. As argued by Ghatak (1998), this
is because NGOs tend to have a stronger ability to reach out to relevant in-
terest groups and gather trust and participation from local beneficiaries. Note
however, rather than disregarding the importance of local governmental insti-
tutions, this argument simply argues that some responsibilities should be dele-
gated to NGOs who can be more effective in some roles and provide assistance
to local institutions. Note also that it is not always true that local institu-
tions are not strong enough to deal with collective action problems. There
are plenty of examples of strong governmental institutions (see Fitzgerald and
Wolak (2016)) that have been successful on their own.
Another question one may ask is what an institution needs or needs to do to
succeed in garnering voluntary participation in public good production. Sev-
eral literatures have discussed many different things that a local institution
can do to increase voluntary participation. Kosfeld et al., (2009) showed how
sanctioning institutions are effective in increasing cooperation in public good
production. Although, such institutions have been shown to be effective, ques-
tions may arise on whether such policy, such as sanctioning, is a moral way to
induce cooperation, especially in developmental settings where potential par-
ticipants experience many limitations.
One example of an institutional factor that may be suitable in developmen-
tal setting is trust. A person in a community that trusts itself to be able to
collectively deliver a public good is more likely to participate in collective ac-
tion. A person that trusts its local institution to convince other members of
the community to participate in collective action, is also more likely to partic-
ipate. This is because, in both cases, they know that their effort will not be in
vain. Rompf et al., (2017) conducted a study on collective action in the case
of recycling. They studied two different categories of trust: institutional trust,
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defined as “trust in the reliability, effectiveness and legitimacy of public insti-
tutions”, and generalized social trust, defined as trust in the actions of other
people in the society. They showed that both categories of trust are effective
in raising participation in recycling behaviour. They also showed that insti-
tutional trust not only increases participation, but it also lowers the negative
effect of increasing cost. Their argument on trust is consistent with the result
of the tracing procedure which suggests that if individuals trust (or believe)
that others are participating, to some extent, in the public good production,
then they will participate too.
Giddens (1990) argued that the link between institutional trust and partici-
pation in collective action is due to the intrinsic beliefs among those with high
institutional trust that the actions and behaviours of others are regulated and
there exists standards and rules that are followed by all. Social trust, on the
other hand, promotes cooperation by creating a perception of trustworthiness
and that it should be reciprocated by all individuals (Romf et al., 2007 and
Sønderskov, 2011). These arguments suggest that a policy-maker maybe more
effective in garnering participation in public good production if they have a
stronger ability to build trust from and among his community members.
Trust was just an example of many institutional factors that could potentially
improve collective action. Different institutional factors may also be needed for
different types of public goods (for examples, the need of social capital in envi-
ronmental planning (Rydin and Pennington, 2010) and property rights in the
adoption of agricultural and natural resource management (McCulloch et al.,
1998)). Social institutions, such as social trust (as discussed above), economic
and social heterogeneity (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006) and social norms and the
ability to communicate it (Thomas and Sharp, 2013), have also been shown to
influence participation in collective action. It is also a role of the policy-maker
to continually strengthen these institutional factors to sustain collective action.
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2.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, my model suggests that signalling, even if perfectly informative
about the benefit of the public good, is not enough to guarantee the production
of the public good. There are cases where signalling can help ensure that a
threshold equilibrium is part of the equilibrium set, but signalling alone cannot
eliminate the free-riding equilibrium from the equilibrium set. It was shown
that the free-riding equilibrium is a stochastically stable equilibrium, which
means that without any mechanism to solve collective action problem, it is
likely to prevail over the threshold equilibria. However, it was also shown using
the tracing procedure that the agents’ prior beliefs affect the outcome of the
game and it provides some conditions, under which a threshold equilibrium will
be selected over the free-riding equilibrium.
The key implication of this result for voluntary public good production, is that
policies targeted at raising awareness, such as advertising campaigns, alone
is not enough to guarantee sufficient participation in public good production.
I argue that along with such intervention, a policy-maker needs to be able
strengthen their governing and social institutions in such a way that strength-
ens trust and cooperation.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
In this section, I show how the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of my model was
derived. Denote µ(BH |s) as the agents’ posterior beliefs that the public good
is BH after s is observed.
Pooling Equilibrium (sL, sL)
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Suppose the policy-maker plays the strategy (sL, sL). This strategy is not
informative to the agents, by Bayes’ rule, their posterior beliefs after observing
sL will be the same as their prior; µ(BH |sL) = p. The agents’ expectation of
the benefit of the public good is then E(b|sL) = pBH + (1 − p)BL. As shown
in Section 3, there are only two possible types of collective response from the
agents in pure strategy, either
∑
i∈N xi = 0 (free-riding) or
∑
i∈N xi = m (de-
sirable).
The collective response from the agents depend on the cost profile of the agents.
If |M¯ | < m, the only possible outcome is all agents choose (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) =
0). This is because there are not enough agents willing to voluntarily support
the cooperative equilibrium. If |M¯ | ≥ E(b|sL), both the free-riding and the
desirable equilibrium are possible, because both outcomes comply with the de-
cision rule (2.3). If the collective response of the agents is such that all agents
choose (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0), the policy-maker will maintain the same pool-
ing strategy (sL, sL) if at least |N | − m + 1 agents hold off-equilibrium-path
beliefs such that µ(BH |sH) < γi−BLP (piv|x−i)P (piv|x−i)(BH−BL) . If this condition holds, there
always exist a pooling strategy where the policy-maker chooses (sL, sL) and
the agents choose the strategy (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0). On the other hand,
if the outcome
∑
i∈N xi = m is reached, this means that the public good will
be produced when sL is observed by the agents. Therefore, there is no rea-
son for the policy-maker to choose sH in any case, as this will only increase
their cost. The pooling strategy (sL, sL) with m agents choosing the strategy
(xi(sL) = 1, xi(sH) = 0) or (xi(sL) = 1, xi(sH) = 1) is also a pooling equilib-
rium.
Pooling Equilibrium (sH , sH)
Under the strategy (sH , sH), by Bayes’ rule, the agents’ posterior beliefs and
collective response mirror that of (sL, sL). This means that any outcome that
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can be achieved with (sH , sH) can also be achieved with (sL, sL) which is a
strictly less costly strategy than (sH , sH). Therefore there cannot be a pooling
equilibrium where the policy-maker chooses the strategy (sH , sH).
Separating Strategy (sL, sH)
If the policy-maker chooses the separating strategy (sL, sH), the agents’ pos-
terior beliefs will be µ(BH |sL) = 0 and µ(BH |sH) = 1. The collective re-
sponse from the agents depend on their cost profile. If |MLH | < m, the
only response from the agents will be such that all agents choose the strategy
(xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0), because not enough agents can voluntarily participate
in the production of either public good.
If |MLH | ≥ m and |MLH |−|MH | < m, which means that at least an agent from
MH is needed for the public good to be produced, it is impossible for the public
good of type BL to be produced. There are two possible collective responses
from the agents, either all agents choose the strategy (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0)
or exactly m agents choose (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 1) and the other agents
choose (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0). In the former case, the policy-maker will
respond with the strategy (sL, sL), which means that there is no separating
equilibrium where the policy-maker chooses (sL, sH) and the agents choose
(xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0). In the latter case, the policy-maker will maintain
the same strategy if c(sH) > BL, otherwise the policy-maker will be willing to
choose sH instead when b = BL, given the posterior beliefs of the agents. If
c(sH) > BL, there exists separating equilibria, where the policy-maker chooses
(sL, sH) and exactly m agents choose (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 1) and the other
agents choose (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 0). There exists exactly
|MLH |!
m!(|MLH |−m)! such
equilibria.
If |MLH | > m and |MLH | − |MH | ≥ m, which means that agents from MH
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are not needed for the public good to be produced, there are three possi-
ble outcomes. Firstly, the agents may again choose the strategy, (xi(sL) =
0, xi(sH) = 0), in which case, the policy-maker will change their strategy to
(sL, sL). Secondly, we may reach an outcome where exactly m agents from the
set MLH \MH choose the strategy (xi(sL) = 1, xi(sH) = 1). In this case, the
policy-maker will want to divert to the strategy (sL, sL), because they do not
need to use the more costly signal sH for the public good to be produced when
b = BH . Thirdly, we may reach an outcome where exactly m agents choose the
strategy (xi(sL) = 0, xi(sH) = 1), but at least 1 of the m agents are from the
set MH . In this case, the policy-maker will have no incentive to deviate to any
other strategy. Therefore, this can be a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Separating Strategy (sH , sL)
The strategy (sH , sL) cannot be part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This
is simply because the posterior beliefs of the agents will be µ(BH |sL) = 1 and
µ(BH |sH) = 0 and under the assumption that c(sH) > c(sL), the policy-maker
will always prefer sL over sH for all possible responses from the agents when
b = BL. Therefore, the separating strategy (sH , sL) cannot be part of a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium.
2.7.2 Equilibrium Selection: Stochastic Stability
I apply the stochastic stability concept (Young, 1993) here in a similar way as
Ghosal and Proto (2009), except that my model deals with n individual agents
instead of a continuum of agents of unit measure.
Let g denote the normal form game played by the agents. The concept of
stochastic stability assumes that agents may make mistakes when taking ac-
tion or they may experiment with different actions with some small probability
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ε. Agents then optimally respond to the mistakes that they observe2. Denote
g(ε) as the perturbed game. As discussed above, there are two types of equi-
libria in the game g, the free-riding equilibrium (denote as type a1) and an
equilibrium where exactly m agents participate in the production of the public
good (denote as type a2). There can be more than one type a2 equilibria. The
question we try to answer is which of these is stochastically stable. Young
(1993) defines stochastically stable states as states with the least resistance.
Denote M = {i ∈ N : E(b|s) ≥ γi}. Suppose we are in a state where |M | ≥ m,
so that there exist both types of equilibrium. Suppose we are in any of the
a2 equilibria. To move from any of these states to the free-riding equilibrium,
the minimum number of mistakes required is one. This is because if a partic-
ipating agent makes a mistake, there can be two outcomes, either one of the
non-participating agents responds by choosing to participate, in which case we
move to another type a2 equilibrium, or one of the participating agents choose
to not participate because they are no longer pivotal, in which case we take a
zero resistance path towards the free-riding equilibrium. This argument holds
for transitions from any of the type a2 equilibria to the free-riding equilibrium.
This means that the resistance of the free-riding equilibrium equals the number
of a2 equilibria,
|M |!
m!(|M |−m)! .
The next step is to find the resistance of the type a2 equilibria. Suppose
again that we are in any of the a2 equilibria. To move from an a2 equilibrium
to another of the same type, it always require at least one mistake. This is
because they are all strict pure strategy equilibria, which means there can be
no path of zero resistance between them. Suppose that we are in the free-riding
equilibrium. To move to any of the a2 equilibria requires a minimum of m− 1
2Young (1993) assumes that agents take a sample of history of play of size k and choose
their action optimally. Theorem 1 of Young (1993) sets the upper limit of k. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, I assume that k = 1.
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mistakes. This is required so that there is at least one other agent whose best
response is to participate. This means that the resistance of each of the type
a2 equilibria is at least
|M |!
m!(|M |−m)! − 1 + m − 1. We can derive the condition
for which the free-riding equilibrium is the unique stochastically stable equilib-
rium by setting |M |!
m!(|M |−m)! <
|M |!
m!(|M |−m)! − 1 +m− 1. Therefore, the free-riding
equilibrium is stochastically stable if m > 2. Note that this was derived using
the lower limit of the resistance of each type a2 equilibrium only. If |M | −m is
large, the lower limit of m for the free-riding equilibrium to be stochastically
stable can be lower.
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Chapter 3
Public Good Game with
Incomplete Information and the
Dynamic of its Production
Function
3.1 Introduction
Public goods and collective action in general are very important to many levels
of our society. At a global level, we need to work together to tackle global
warming and climate change. On the other extreme, at a local community
level, community members need to work together to, for example, construct
roads and irrigation systems, to improve their livelihood. In developmental
settings, public goods are particularly important because its potential benefi-
ciaries usually cannot afford private alternatives to the public goods. However,
public good production at almost any level and collective action in general are
prone to collective action problem.
Literatures such as by Libecap (1994), Olson (1965) and Ostrom (1998, 2007
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and 2010) discussed how difficult it is to succeed in collective action and how
complex collective action is in terms of the number of variables that could influ-
ence its likelihood of success. These variables include, for example the ability
to build coalitions, group (population) size, heterogeneity of participants’ pref-
erences, the ability to communicate and other structural factors. Yet, not
all literatures agree on how these variables affect the success of collective ac-
tion. For instance, Olson (1965) argued that collective action is more likely to
succeed in smaller groups than in larger groups. Agrawal (1996) provided an
evidence that showed otherwise. Oliver and Marwell (1988), on the other hand,
argued that the effect of group size on collective action is context dependent,
specifically it depends on participation costs and the heterogeneity of partici-
pants’ preferences. Clearly, understanding collective action is challenging and
it needs clear and detailed analyses of the effect of each of the structural factors.
One structural factor that many literatures on collective action tend to dis-
regard is the dynamic of a public good’s production function. Some of the
few known literatures that analyse of how the production function can affect
the outcome of a public good game include Oberschall (1980, 1994), Marwell
and Oliver (1991, 1993) and Oliver et al., (1985). They showed that the out-
comes of public good games with different production functions can have very
different results and dynamics and that they may require different solutions.
However, their analyses were set in an informal setting and in the context of
social movements instead of a more general setting.
To show how public goods with different production function shapes require
different solutions, I raise two examples. Berger (2003) and Shepherd (1992)
showed that maintaining peace amongst nomadic pastoralists require a more
institutional solution, which was to build the capacity of leaders to manage re-
sources and resolve conflicts, and an educational solution that involved raising
awareness was ineffective. In the case of disease elimination, it has been shown
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that an effective policy comprises both raising awareness and the reduction
of participation cost (Beyenne et al., (2018), Castillo-Neyra et al., (2017) and
Castillo-Neyra et al., (2019)).
In this chapter, I study how the shape of a public good’s production function
affect voluntary participation in its production. However, I do so in a game
theoretic context, which can give a more detailed and analytical result than
the studies mentioned above. This chapter follows from the previous chapter
in the sense that I will be looking at public good production of different types
(production function shape), which provides some insight into the relevance of
a structural factor in public good production. In addition, I make a more real-
istic assumption that participants incur different participation costs and that
they do not know the participation costs of each other, except the distribution
of the cost. The assumption that private costs of participation is private knowl-
edge and that only its distribution is common knowledge, is more realistic than
the assumption of complete information. In practice, individuals may have an
idea or a rough estimate of what others’ participation costs are, but they do
no always know the exact values. From a technical and theoretical perspective,
there are two key advantages of assuming incomplete information. Firstly, it
provides a more easily interpretable equilibrium. Examples of these can be
seen in Morris and Shin (1998) and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2013). Both
of these studies showed that the existence of threshold equilibria where each
agent’s action depends on their private information about themselves. Sec-
ondly, it can be used to narrow down the set of equilibria (Morris and Shin,
2001). Morris and Shin (1998) and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2013) showed
that assuming incomplete information can lead to unique equilibrium, but as I
will show below, there are cases where there can still be multiple equilibria.
Results from my analysis show that the set of equilibria of this game is de-
pendent on the shape of the public good’s production function. I show that
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there always exists at least one symmetric threshold equilibrium, in which an
agent participates if his participation cost is below a certain threshold and not
participate otherwise. When the production function is concave, there always
exists a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium. When the production func-
tion is convex, there exists a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium if the
benefit of the public good is small, but there can be up to three equilibria,
including one where everyone participates, when the benefit of the public good
is large enough. When the production function is a step-function, the equi-
librium set depends on what the threshold for public good production is. An
interesting feature when the production function is a step-function is that the
free-riding equilibrium, in which no one participates in the public good pro-
duction always exists, except when the production function is such that only
one person is needed to produce the public good. As an extension, I show
that if the production function is s-shape, the set of equilibria is similar to the
case when the production function is a step function when it has a very steep
section. However, if it does not have a particularly steep section, or it is closer
in shape to a linear function, then there exists only one threshold equilibrium.
From these results, I also provide some policy implications for different cases
of public good. One policy that can be effective in many cases is the reduction
of private participation cost. Such policy may include, for example, subsidies,
but such policy can be very costly. Other policies that do not involve cost
reduction can also be effective in some cases. I argue that when the public
good has a concave production function, a good policy should target at re-
ducing private cost of participation, because other policies such as advertising
to increase salience or perceived benefit of a public good tend to have only a
very limited effect. When the production function is convex, a good policy
should be to make the collective benefit of the public good salient and focus
on getting participants to commit to participating at a higher cost. When the
production function is a step function, I argue that a combination of policies
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is needed. It should make the collective benefit of the public good salient, en-
courage full participation instead of just enough to produce the public good,
reduce participation cost and convince participants to commit to participating.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. The next section provides a layout
of the model being studied. Section 3 analyses the equilibria of the model.
Section 4 discusses some extensions I made to the analysis of the model, which
includes a comparative static analysis and a brief discussion on the outcomes of
the public good game when the production function is s-shape. Section 5 pro-
vides a general discussion which includes the policy implications of the results
in Section 3 and 4, and some case studies. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Model
There is a group of n agents indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Each agent i has two
action choices denoted by ai ∈ {0, 1}. ai = 1 indicates agent i choosing to par-
ticipate in producing the public good and ai = 0 indicates otherwise. Agent
i incurs a private cost ci if he chooses to participate. ci is independently and
uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. ci is known only to i. Only the distribution from
which ci’s are drawn is common knowledge.
The assumption of a finite number of agents is used here because I am more
interested in the collective action or public good production at a local level,
where participation is generally required from a relatively small number of
people. One may alternatively assume a continuum of agents. However, this
suggests that there is a large number of agents and the contribution of each
agent in the public good production is insignificant (Aumann et al., (1987)),
which is not always the case in developmental settings, where each individual
unit of participation is actually significant.
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In addition, I could have allowed positive private net benefit because some
may obtain direct private benefit from participating in public good production
(for example, see Andreoni (1990)). However, it is obvious that those who can
obtain positive private net benefit from participating will always participate in
public good production and we are more interested in understanding the deci-
sion of those with positive participation costs. Hence, I restrict my analysis to
those with positive participation costs only.
Denote r−i =
∑
I 6=i aI
n
as the proportion of agents apart from i who choose
to participate in the public good production. Denote r = r−i + ain as the total
proportion of agents participating. Denote P (r) as the probability that the
public good is successfully produced given r. It is assumed that P (.) is strictly
increasing in r, except when P (.) is a step function, where, by definition, P (.)
can only be increasing, and P (1) = 1. If the public good is successfully pro-
duced, all agents receive a collective benefit of θ > 0. For simplicity, I assume
that θ = 11.
P (.) can take many different shapes, but for any given game, the shape of
the production function is common knowledge. I look at cases where P (.) is
concave, convex and a step-function (as an extension I will also discuss a case
where P (.) is s-shape). If P (.) is a concave function, the marginal increase
in P (.) decreases as the number of participants increases. An example of this
is the creation of a social group, the first few units of participation in most
important because they are what start the social group itself, any additional
participation can help sustain the social group, but it is unlikely to be as crucial
as the first units. If P (.) is convex, the marginal increase in P (.) increases as
the number of participants increases. An example of this is maintaining peace
among nomadic pastoralists as mentioned above. A few tribes committing to
1In Section 4, I relax this assumption and investigate how it influences the final outcome
of the model.
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peaceful co-existence with other tribes does not contribute much to peace if
the other tribes do not do the same. If even a single tribe continues to be
aggressive, it is difficult for the other tribes to continue their peaceful way of
life even if they can commit to that among themselves. Any tribe that does not
trust that other tribes can commit to being peaceful will believe that taking a
more aggressive stance is crucial for their survival. If P (.) is a step-function,
the marginal increase in P (.) is typically zero except at the “step(s)”, where
an additional agent participating in the public good production would give a
sharp increase in P (.). Examples of these are all threshold public goods.
Another underlying assumption made is that the value of the benefit of the
public good is common knowledge and known to all agents. This assumption
is applicable in many developmental settings for a few reasons. Firstly, benefi-
ciaries of a public good tend to know very well how they and and their whole
community can benefit from the public good. For instance, villagers in an agri-
cultural community know very well how the construction and maintenance of
an irrigation system benefit them as a group (Bardhan, 2000). Secondly, for
some public goods, additional interventions such as from the local authorities
and other organisations tend to raise awareness of the public good prior to it
being produced. Therefore, by the time community members need to decide
whether they should participate in the public good production or not, they can
be quite well informed about the benefit of the public good already.
Given all these assumptions, the expected utility function of an agent i can
be written as follows:
EUi(ai, r−i, ci) = P (r−i, ai)− ciai (3.1)
The timeline of the model is as follows:
- At time t = 1, Nature draws the agents’ private participation cost ci’s
- At time t = 2, each agent observes only his/her own private cost of partici-
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pating and choose whether to participate in the public good production
-At time t = 3, the public good is produced with probability P (r) and all
agents receive the benefit of the public good if it is produced, or not if it is not
produced.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this incomplete information game, I define an agent’s strategy as a function
of his/her private cost of participation. I assume that agents who are indifferent
between participating and not participating will always choose to participate.
Suppose now that a fraction r−i of other agents choose to participate, i’s ex-
pected pay-off from participating can be written as:
EUi(ai = 1) = P
(
r−i +
1
n
)
− ci
His expected pay-off from not participating can be written as:
EUi(ai = 0) = P (r−i)
Agent i would participate in the public good production only if his expected
pay-off from doing so exceeds that of not participating. Therefore, we can
obtain the condition for i’s participation:
P
(
r−i +
1
n
)
− P (r−i) ≥ ci (3.2)
Since we assume that P (.) is increasing, the left-hand side of (3.2) is always
positive. The right-hand side of (3.2) is non-negative by assumption. Condition
(3.2) suggests that for i to participate, the efficacy of his participation or the
probability that he is pivotal in the public good production has to exceed his
cost of participation. If ci is zero, then i would always participate. If ci is one,
then i would never participate unless P (.) is a step-function and i is pivotal
(in other words, the left-hand side of (3.2) is equal to one). It is unclear what
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action i would take if ci is between zero and one, but a natural strategy one
may consider is a threshold strategy around some value c in which i chooses to
participate for ci ≤ c and not participate otherwise.
Suppose now that all agents except i adopt the threshold strategy around
some cost c and i’s participation cost is ci. Denote pj(c) as the probability
that exactly j other agents apart from i have participation cost of c or less.
Since it is assumed that ci is independently and uniformly drawn from [0, 1],
the probability that an agent has a participation cost of c or less is simply c.
We can then write pj(c) as:
pj(c) =
(
n− 1
j
)
cj(1− c)n−1−j
We can then write i’s expected utility from participating as:
EUi(ai = 1) =
n−1∑
j=0
pj(c)P
(j + 1
n
)
− ci
Similarly, i’s expected utility from not participating can be written as:
EUi(ai = 0) =
n−1∑
j=0
pj(c)P
( j
n
)
We can then derive i’s condition for participating as:
n−1∑
j=0
pj(c)δj ≥ ci (3.3)
where δj = P
(
j+1
n
) − P( j
n
)
. Condition (3.3) suggests that agent i would par-
ticipate if the expected efficacy of his participation or the expected probability
that he is pivotal given other agents adopt the threshold strategy around c
exceeds his private cost of participation. Treating both sides of the inequality
(3.3) as functions of c and ci respectively, we can find the set of equilibria geo-
metrically by finding the range of c and ci over which condition (3.3) is satisfied.
The right-hand side of (3.3) is clearly a 45 degree line within the domain [0, 1].
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Note that
∑n−1
j=0 pj(c) = 1, for all c ∈ [0, 1] which means that the left-hand side
of (3.3) is a convex combination of the numbers δ0, ..., δn−1, with pj(c) as their
respective weights. We also know that δj ∈ [0, 1] for all j, therefore the range
of the left-hand side of (3.3) must be a proper subset of [0, 1]. This suggests
that there is at least one intersection point between the left-hand side and the
right-hand side of (3.3). This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1: In the game described above, there always exist at least
one symmetric threshold equilibrium.
Proof: This is immediate from the preceding argument.
Concave P (.)
When P (.) is concave, 0 < δj < 1 and δj−1 > δj for all j ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}.
These suggest that within the domain c ∈ [0, 1], the range of the left-hand side
of (3.3) has to be [δn−1, δ0], which is a strict subset of [0, 1]. It can also be
shown that as c increases from 0 to 1, the convex combination shifts its weight
gradually from being completely on δ0 to δn−1 (see Appendix for proof). This
suggests that the left-hand side of (3.3) is a decreasing function in c. Given
that the left-hand side of (3.3) is continuous, decreasing in c and its range is
a proper subset of [0, 1] and the right-hand side of (3.3) is an increasing 45
degree line, the curves representing both sides of (3.3) must intersect exactly
once at some c∗. Given that the agents are also symmetric, there must be only
one symmetric threshold equilibrium around some c∗, in which agents whose
private cost is less than or equal to c∗ will participate and those whose private
cost is higher will choose not to participate. This result is illustrated in Figure
3.1 and it leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1A: If P (.) is a concave function, then there always exists
exactly one symmetric threshold equilibrium.
Proof: This result is immediate from the preceding argument.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium for concave P (.)Figure 3.2: Equilibrium for convex P (.)
Convex P (.)
When P (.) is convex, 0 < δj < 1 and δj−1 < δj for all j ∈ {1, ..., n−1}. Follow-
ing the same argument as the case of concave P (.), we know that the left-hand
side of condition (3.3) has a range of [δ0, δn−1] and is an increasing function of
c. Therefore there must exist at least one intersection point between the curve
representing the left-hand side of (3.3) and the 45 degree line representing the
right-hand side of (3.3). It can be proven that there must be exactly one inter-
section point (see Appendix). Therefore, when P (.) is convex, there is exactly
one symmetric threshold equilibrium around c∗. Note, however, that this result
is true only because it has been assumed that the benefit of the public good θ is
equal to 12. This result is illustrated in Figure 3.2 and it leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.1B: If P (.) is a convex function and θ = 1, then there al-
ways exists exactly one symmetric threshold equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
2The next section discusses what happens when we relax this assumption and allow θ to
be greater than 1
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Step-function P (.)
When P (.) is a step-function, δj must be zero for all j, except at some j˜ at
which δj˜ must be positive. Therefore, condition (3.3) is reduced to:
pj˜(c)δj˜ ≥ ci (3.4)
It can be shown that for any j˜, pj˜(c) is a single peak function in c, which peaks
at c = n−1
j˜
. Since δj˜ is a positive number, the left-hand side of (3.4) must
also be a single peak function. It can take many different geometric shapes
depending on the values of δj˜ and j˜ itself. Figure (3.3) provides illustrations of
all possible cases.
Figure (3.3a) illustrates what happens when j˜ = 0 or when only one agent
is needed to produce the public good. In this case, there is only one intersec-
tion between the left-hand side of (3.4) and the 45-degree line at c = c∗ > 0.
This suggests that there is a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium around
c∗ > 0.
Figure (3.3b) illustrates what happens when j˜ = 1 or when only two agents
are needed to produce the public good. In this case, there are two symmetric
threshold equilibria, one where no one with positive participation cost partic-
ipates and one where only those with costs c∗2 or lower participate. However,
only the latter equilibrium is the stable equilibrium.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibria when P (.) is a step-function
(a) j˜ = 0 (b) j˜ = 1 (c) j˜ = n− 1
(d) j˜ small (e) j˜ large
Figure (3.3c) illustrates what happens when j˜ = n − 1. In this case, there
are also two symmetric threshold equilibria, one around c∗1 = 0 and the other
around c∗2 = 1. The first equilibrium suggests that virtually no one will partic-
ipate in the public good production and the other suggests that everyone will
participate. However, the latter equilibrium is unstable and likely diverges to
the former equilibrium.
Figure (3.3d) illustrates what happens when j˜ is small but greater than one.
In this case, there are three symmetric threshold equilibria, around c∗1, c
∗
2 and
c∗3. However, the equilibrium around c
∗
2 is an unstable equilibrium which likely
diverges to one of the other two equilibria.
Figure (3.3e) illustrates what happens when j˜ is large by less than n − 1. In
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this case there is only one equilibrium around c = c∗ = 0. This suggests that
when the participation threshold for the public good to be produced is high,
it is most likely that no agent will participate because the only equilibrium is
one where agents participate only if their private cost of participation is zero.
These results lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1C: If P (.) is a step-function with some j˜ as the only point
where δj˜ is strictly positive, then the set of equilibria depends on the where j˜
is:
• If j˜ = 0, then there exists exactly one symmetric threshold equilibrium.
• If j˜ = 1, then there exists two symmetric threshold equilibria, at c∗1 = 0
and 0 < c∗2 < 1, with the latter being the stable equilibrium.
• If j˜ = n− 1, then there exists two symmetric threshold equilibrium, one
around c∗1 = 0 and the other around c
∗
2 = 1, with the latter being an
unstable equilibrium.
• If j˜ is small but greater than one, then there exists three symmetric
threshold equilibria around some values c∗1, c
∗
2 and c
∗
3, where c
∗
1 = 0 and
c∗1 < c
∗
2 < c
∗3. In addition, the equilibrium around c∗2 is an unstable
equilibrium which likely diverges to one of the other two equilibria.
• If j˜ is large but less than n− 1, then there exists exactly one symmetric
threshold equilibrium around c∗ = 0.
Proof: The existence of equilibria in all these cases have been proven by exam-
ples shown in Figure 3.3. For formal proof, see Appendix.
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3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Comparative Statics
The results above were reached under the assumption that ci ∈ [0, 1] and that
the benefit of the public good θ is equal to 1 (the maximum possible value
of ci). One may be interested in understanding what would happen if these
assumptions are relaxed. It is, however, unnecessary to relax both assumptions
as they are both relative terms. In this subsection, I analyse what happens to
the equilibrium set in each case if θ is allowed to be less than or greater than one.
For θ 6= 1, condition (3.3) can be rewritten as:
θ
n−1∑
j=0
pj(c)δj ≥ ci (3.5)
Geometrically, the left-hand side of (3.5) is a vertical compression (for 0 < θ <
1) or a vertical stretch (for θ > 1) of the left-hand side of (3.3). It is obvious
that for 0 < θ < 1, the left-hand side of (3.5) is a vertical compression of the
left-hand side of (3.3) and its range is still a strict subset of [0, 1], therefore it
has no effect on the equilibrium set of the game for any shape of P (.), except
for changes in the locations of the symmetric threshold equilibria.
For θ > 1, the left-hand side of (3.5) is a vertical stretch of the left-hand
side of (3.3). This suggests that for θ large enough, the range of the left-hand
side of (3.5) will no longer be a strict subset of [0, 1]. This has no effect on the
equilibrium set when P (.) is concave except for the change in the locations of
the threshold equilibria.
However, when P (.) is a convex function, for θ large enough the left-hand
side of (3.5) is increasing in c and its range may no longer be a strict subset of
[0, 1]. This can lead to two cases, one where there is no intersection between
the left-hand side of (3.5) and one where there are two intersections. These
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cases are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 plots the left-hand side of (3.5) for three different values of θ,
θ1 < θ2 < θ3. At θ1 which is greater than 1 but not large enough so that
the range of the left-hand side of (3.5) is still a proper subset of [0, 1], the
result is the same as illustrated in Figure 3.2 and there is only one threshold
equilibrium. At θ2 there are two intersections between the left-hand side of
(3.5) and the 45 degree line, at c∗21 and c
∗
22. In this case, there are three thresh-
old equilibria at c∗21, c
∗
22 and at c
∗
23 = 1. However, the equilibrium around
c∗22 is unstable and diverges downwards towards the equilibrium around c
∗
21 or
upwards towards c∗23 = 1. The latter equilibrium means that all agents will
participate in the public good production. When θ is very large, then there is
only one symmetric threshold equilibrium where everyone participate. These
lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1B’: If we allow θ > 1 and P (.) is convex, then the equi-
librium set of the game is as follows:
• If θ is greater than one, but small enough that the left-hand side of (3.5)
is a strict subset of [0, 1], then there exists a unique threshold equilibrium
around c∗11.
• If θ is greater than one and the left-hand side of (3.5) is not a strict subset
of [0, 1], then there may exist three threshold equilibria at c∗21, c
∗
22 and at
c∗23 = 1, where 0 < c
∗
21 < c
∗
22 < c
∗
23 and c
∗
23 = 1. The equilibrium around
c∗22 is unstable and diverges to one of the other two equilibria.
• If θ is very large, so that the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side
of (3.5) for all c, then there exist a unique threshold equilibrium around
1. This suggests that all agents will participate in the public good pro-
duction.
When P (.) is a step-function, the left-hand side of (3.3) is a bell-shape curve
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except when j˜ = 0 and when j˜ = n−1. Therefore, a vertical stretch of the left-
hand side of (3.3), or increasing θ is likely to have little effect on the equilibrium
set of the game, apart from that it raises the threshold equilibria marginally
and it allows for positive threshold equilibria (where the threshold is strictly
positive) for larger j˜. However, when j˜ = n− 1, the key affect of an increased
θ is that it turns the equilibrium where everyone participates from being an
unstable equilibrium to being a stable equilibrium. In addition, there exists an
additional threshold equilibrium, however this is unstable and likely diverges
to one of the other two equilibria. These are illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Proposition 3.1C’: If P (.) is a step-function with j˜ = n − 1 and θ > 1,
then there exists three symmetric threshold equilibria, c∗1 = 0, 0 < c
∗
2 < 1 and
c∗3 = 1. The interior equilibrium is unstable and likely diverges to one of the
other two equilibria.
Figure 3.4: Threshold Equilibria for
convex P (.) and θ3 > θ2 > θ1 > 1
Figure 3.5: Threshold Equilibria for
step P (.), j˜ = n−1, θ1 = 1 and θ2 > 1
3.4.2 S-shape Production Function
The production function of a public good can often take a more general form
of an s-shape function. In an s-shape function, the efficacy of an agents’ par-
ticipation increases as the number of other participants increases, but after a
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certain threshold, the efficacy of the agent’s participation starts to fall. An ex-
ample of this is in disease elimination through mass vaccination. When there
are few people vaccinating themselves against a disease, an additional person
vaccinating himself does little to the elimination of the disease. However, as
the number of people vaccinated reaches closer and closer to the threshold for
herd immunity, the likelihood of the disease being eliminated increases much
quicker. Once herd immunity is achieved, disease elimination is certain and the
next person getting vaccinated makes little to no difference to this outcome.
Drawing a general theoretical conclusion on what the outcome of the game
is like when P (.) is s-shape is complex and near impossible because of the
many different variations of an s-shape function. Specifically, a detailed anal-
ysis of this case needs to take into account many factors such as where the
steepest part of the function is, how steep is the steepest part and what is the
general dynamic of the function.
However, we can draw some insight from two extreme cases of an s-shape
function. One extreme version of an s-shape function is a step-function, which
has been discussed above. The other extreme is a linear function, in which
δj = δj+1 = δ for all j ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, where δ > 0. Therefore, for a linear P (.)
condition (3.3) is reduced to:
δ > ci
Clearly, the left-hand side of (3.3) or (3.5) becomes a horizontal line when P (.)
is linear. Therefore, there can only be one threshold equilibrium when P (.) is
a linear function.
Comparing these two extreme cases we can draw the following conclusions.
When P (.) is a mild s-shape function (or almost linear), there tend to be only
one threshold equilibrium. However, as P (.) becomes closer and closer to the
shape of a step-function, the characteristics of its equilibria are more likely to
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follow those of a step-function.
3.5 Implications and Discussion
3.5.1 Policy Implications
After obtaining the earlier results, one may question what their policy impli-
cations are or how this can contribute to guiding a policy-maker in making a
more effective policy. The first general practical implication from the earlier
analyses is that potential participants in public good production collectively
respond differently to different production functions and also to different poli-
cies. The next question would be what kind of policy should be implemented
in each of those cases.
One obvious policy that can be very effective in all cases is the reduction of par-
ticipation cost. It can be seen very clearly from the conditions (3.3) and (3.5)
and the characterisation of all equilibria that cost reduction can be very effec-
tive in increasing participation. However, different production function shapes
also have different characteristics that may respond well to policies other than
cost reduction. I will discuss the policy implications case by case.
When P (.) is concave, it has been shown that there is a unique threshold
equilibrium. In this theoretical framework, a policy-maker can increase partic-
ipation by raising a (stable) symmetric threshold equilibrium to a higher point.
A typical policy to do that is to raise awareness and the perceived benefit of the
public good. Such policy is unlikely to be effective in maximising participation
when P (.) is concave. To see this, suppose that such policy raises the perceived
benefit of the public good to some θ. As argued in the previous section, raising
θ only creates a vertical stretch of the left-hand side of (3.3). This suggests that
when P (.) is concave, any intervention designed to raise the perceived benefit of
a public good is likely to only marginally raise the number of participants. To
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raise a significant number of participants, the improved perception may have
to be impossibly large. A more effective policy would be to reduce the cost of
participation so that it is within the threshold of as many agents as possible.
When P (.) is convex, a completely different policy should be implemented.
As shown in the previous section, an increase in θ or the perceived benefit of
the public good can easily create a new stable symmetric threshold equilibrium
around 1, at which point, everyone participates. This means that it creates a
range of ci such that as long as sufficient number of participants are willing
to commit to participating at a cost within this range, the outcome naturally
converges to the equilibrium where everyone participate. This suggests that a
good policy, when P (.) is convex, is to raise the perceived benefit of the public
good and to encourage potential participants to commit to participating at a
higher participation cost or to create an environment where individuals be-
lieve that others are willing to participate in the public good production. Such
policy is completely achievable especially when the benefit of the public good
exceeds the cost of participation. A policy that lacks the ability to get people
to commit to participating is just as likely to fail as in the case of concave P (.).
Figure 3.6 provides a comparison between the case of a concave production
function (Figure 3.6a) and that of its inverse (Figure 3.6b), which is a convex
production function. When the production function is concave, increasing θ by
two times or four times also raises the symmetric threshold equilibrium which
increases the expected number of participants, however this is marginal. On
the other hand, when the production function is convex, doubling θ raises the
symmetric threshold equilibrium by an even smaller margin than in the case
of concave P (.). However, when θ is quadrupled, two new equilibria exist, in-
cluding one where everyone participates and the other which can diverge to it.
This suggests that a policy that increases awareness and perceived benefit of a
public good may be less effect for public goods with convex production func-
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Figure 3.6: Change in equilibria in relation to θ for concave and convex P (.)
(a) Concave P (.) (b) Convex P (.)
tions at the beginning. However, there exists a threshold of perceived benefit,
above which, we can achieve full participation if only just enough participants
can commit to participating.
If P (.) is a step-function, as discussed in the previous section, the most signif-
icant change is when j˜ = n− 1 or when everyone is required to participate for
the public good to be produced. In this case, I showed that the equilibrium
where everyone participates becomes a stable equilibrium and there exists a
range of ci over which, if enough agents can commit to participating within
those range, the outcome will converge to the equilibrium where everyone par-
ticipates. This suggests that when P (.) is a step-function, a good policy needs
to do three things. Firstly, it needs to convince participants that the benefit
of the public good is high enough. Secondly, it needs to convince potential
participants to commit to participating at a higher participation cost. Thirdly,
it should encourage full participation and make salient the importance of full
participation, rather than just high enough for the public good to be produced.
Finally, an alternative to encouraging full participation may be to lower the
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required participation for the public good production j˜ (this may be through
tools such as subsidies or matching funds) or to lower participation cost.
It should also be noted that just because some production functions may in-
duce similar outcome in terms of equilibrium outcome and characteristics, their
equilibrium outcomes do not necessarily respond to the same policy in the same
way. For example, in both cases when P (.) is concave or linear, there always
exists exactly one threshold equilibrium. However, the location of the equilib-
rium will be affected differently by a policy that increases the perceived benefit
of the public good. A vertical stretch to the left-hand side of (3.3) or (3.5)
when P (.) is linear is equivalent to a vertical shift, because then the left-hand
side of (3.3) and (3.5) are horizontal lines. Therefore, an equivalent policy that
increases θ is much more effective in raising participation when P (.) is linear
than when it is concave. This example provides another argument to highlight
the importance of understanding the shape of public good production function
in policy design.
Another case that I briefly discussed was what happens when P (.) is an s-shape
function. I argued that the characteristics of the equilibrium set depends on
the exact shape of the function. If it is a mild s-shape with no extremely steep
slope, then its equilibrium outcome is closer to the case of when P (.) is lin-
ear. In this case, a good policy should be in line with what is suitable for a
linear P (.). This may include raising the perceived benefit of the public good
and reducing participation cost. If it is closer to an s-shape function, then its
equilibrium outcome is closer to the case of when P (.) is an s-shape function.
In this case, a policy should cover what was discussed earlier when P (.) is a
step-function.
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3.5.2 Welfare and Policy Discussion
The previous subsection discussed what targets a good policy should try to
achieve in each case. The next natural step is to discuss whether a particular
policy is worth pursuing. Many different policies can be used to achieve the
targets discussed earlier, however the cost and benefit differ between policies
and contexts within which they are implemented. Therefore, it is difficult to
pin-point which policy is the best policy to achieve each target. However, in
this subsection I will discuss some of the policies that have been shown to be
successful tackling the issues discussed.
The policy that has been recommended in all cases is the reduction of par-
ticipation cost. Clearly, this can be very costly for a policy-maker, especially
when it comes to directly cutting down cost, as this involves compensating
each individual participant for their effort. In this sense, sometimes one may
question whether such policy is worth pursuing. However, evidence have shown
that even a small reduction in participation cost can significantly increase par-
ticipation. For example, this can be done by using selective incentives and
strategies to ease participation. Minyoo et al., (2015) showed that giving sim-
ple incentives such as wrist bands and dog collars can increase participation in
canine rabies vaccination campaigns.
Another target discussed was to get participants to commit to participating
at a higher cost. It should be noted that this policy is reasonable only when
the benefit of the public good is high enough, so that committing to a higher
cost is acceptable to participants if they know that the benefit of the public
good outweighs their participation cost. Several policies can be used to get par-
ticipants to commit. An example of this is guaranteed refunds to participants
if a public good fails to be produced. Cartwright and Stepanova (2015) showed
in an experiment that such policy can increase the likelihood of public goods
being produced. This policy is not costly when participants’ resources used for
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participation are refundable, but it can be very costly if otherwise and if the
public good needs a lot of participation to succeed. Another possible policy
is through behavioural factors such as leadership and altruism. Meinzen-Dick
et al., (2002) provided an empirical example of how leadership and trust in
leadership led to cooperation in the management of canal irrigation systems in
India. Smith (2010) provided a detailed discussion of how not only altruism,
but other behavioural factors such as mutualism, reciprocity and language can
combine to increase cooperation in collective action. These tools do not require
a lot of financial resources as it does not always require direct cost-related in-
terventions, but it requires skills and the ability of policy-makers to convince
and to build trust with potential participants.
Another policy mentioned was to encourage full participation. This policy
recommendation was unique for the case of when the public good production
function is a step-function only, as it allows an equilibrium where everyone
participate to become a stable equilibrium. There is no known research that
looks at this kind of policy specifically for public goods with a step-function as
its production function. However, an example of such policy may be to provide
rewards, which can be financial or psychological, to everyone only if there is
full participation, pairing these rewards with the public good itself. Another
type of intervention can be through behavioural factors as discussed in the last
paragraph.
3.5.3 Application
So far, I have argued that to encourage the production of a public good, it is
crucial to take into account the shape of its production function. In practice,
the shape of the production function as perceived by participants may not al-
ways match with its actual shape. In this case, a policy that is designed to
suit the actual shape of the production function may not be effective because
participants are more likely to respond according to their perception than ac-
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cording to the actual situation. Therefore, as a policy-maker, it is necessary to
understand a community’s perception so that policies can be designed around
it or to try to change the community’s perception if needed.
There has been no known empirical study that tries to find the shape of a
public good’s production function as perceived by a community. A simple way
to do this is to conduct a survey among community members on their percep-
tion of their marginal contribution to a public good given different levels of
contribution from other community members. This survey can then be con-
solidated to obtain the shape of the production function as perceived by the
community. The appendix (sub-subsection 3.7.4) below is a simple example
of a production function survey that was conducted after the field experiment
that will be discussed in Chapter 4.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I show that the shape of a public good’s production function
is an important structural factor determining the outcome of the public good
production. This in turn means that different public goods with different pro-
duction functions may demand different policies to get an effective response.
Therefore, in designing a policy, a policy-maker needs to study clearly what
the shape of the production function looks like, in order to design a suitable
and effective policy.
As discussed briefly in the introduction, there are many structural factors that
could have influenced participation in public good production. The shape of
production functions is just one of them. There are large gaps in the under-
standing of some of those structural factors. To understand collective action
and voluntary participation in public good production fully, it is important
that all structural factors are identified and carefully studied.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Dynamic of the Left-hand Side of (3.3)
Here I show that as c increases from 0 to 1, the left-hand side of (3.3) gradually
shifts its weight from δ0 to δn−1. To do this, I compute pj(c)− pj−1(c):(
n− 1
j
)
cj(1− c)n−1−j −
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
cj−1(1− c)n−j
= cj(1− c)n−j
[(n− 1
j
)
(1− c)−1 −
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
c−1
]
= cj(1− c)n−j
[ (n− 1)!
j!(n− 1− j)!(1− c)
−1 − (n− 1)!
(j − 1)!(n− j)!c
−1
]
cj(1− c)n−j (n− 1)!
(j − 1)!(n− 1− j)!
[(1− c)−1
j
− c
−1
n− j
]
This value is positive only if
[
(1−c)−1
j
− c−1
n−j
]
is positive or j < nc. This suggests
that as c increases from 0 to 1, the convex combination shifts its weight from
left to right. In fact, at c = 0, the weight is completely on the first term δ0 and
at c = 1, the weight is completely on the last term δn−1, where δn−1 < δ0. This
proves that the left-hand side of (3.3) is decreasing in c.
3.7.2 Proof of Unique Equilibrium when P (.) is Convex
Here I prove that there can only be one threshold equilibrium when P (.) is
convex provided θ remains at one. To do so, I only need to prove that the
left-hand side of (3.4) is convex in c. The left-hand side of (3.3) is the expected
efficacy of i’s participation given all other agents adopt some threshold strategy
around c. As c increases, i’s expectation of the number of agents participating
must increase, because an increase in threshold c means that the probability of
each of the other agents participate must be higher. As P (.) is convex, it means
that i’s expected efficacy should be even higher as c increases. Therefore, the
left-hand side of (3.3) must be convex. Since it is convex and increasing and
its range is a proper subset of [0, 1], there can only be one intersection between
the left-hand side of (3.3) and the 45 degree line.
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3.7.3 Set of Equilibria when P (.) is a Step Function
Here, I prove that the set of equilibria of the game when P (.) is a step function
is as discussed above. I begin by discussing the shape of the left-hand side of
(3.4). First I find its derivative with respect to c:
∂pj˜(c)
∂c
=
(
n− 1
j˜
)
cj˜−1(1− c)(n−2−j˜)(j˜ − c(n− 1))
The partial derivative has only three roots within the domain [0, 1], 0, 1, n−1
j˜
.3
The first two roots are at the boundary of the domain of c and the partial
derivative is positive for 0 < c < n−1
j˜
and negative for n−1
j˜
< c < 1. This
means the left-hand side of (3.4) has a single peak at c = n−1
j˜
.
I now show that at j˜ = 1 the slope of the left-hand side of (3.4) is greater
than one at and around c = 0. To show this I simply substitute j˜ = 1 and
c = 0 into the partial derivative, which is then equal to n− 1, which is greater
than 1 for n > 2. Since both the left-hand side of (3.4) and its partial derivative
are also well defined on c, its curve must be higher than the 45 degree line at c
close to zero. And since it is single-peaked and decreases to zero as c increases
to 1, it must cross the 45 degree line again exactly once. This proves that when
j˜ = 1, there is a second crossing point between the left and right-hand side of
(3.4).
I now show that when j˜ > 1, the slope of the left-hand side of (3.4) is less
than one around c = 0. Again, I substitute c = 0 into the partial derivative,
which is then equal to zero. This suggests that if j˜ > 1, the left-hand side of
(3.4) must be less than c for c very close to zero. It can be seen from the partial
derivative that the slope of the left-hand side of (3.4) can be very steep and
positive at lower ranges of c when j˜ is very small relative to n. In this case, if
j˜ is small enough, but greater than 1, the left-hand side of (3.4) can intersect
the 45 degree line as c increases. If it does, it will do so again as it decreases to
30 is not a root when j˜ = 1, however this does not affect the main result.
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zero when c increases to 1. However, if j˜ is large relative to n, then the slope
of the left-hand side of (3.4) is not steep enough to intersect the 45 degree line
as c increases to 1. In this case, there is only one crossing point at c = 0.
3.7.4 Production Function Survey
Approximately one year after the field experiment studied in Chapter 4 of this
thesis, a production function survey was conducted. This survey was conducted
with the same group of villages and villagers that participated in our experi-
ment. However, 2 of the 56 villages were discarded because they were no longer
accessible. In addition, not all households that participated in the household
questionnaire and the cash experiment could be located. Taking this into ac-
count and the number of invalid data, the average number of participants per
village that participated in the production function survey was just over 17
participants and the total number of participants were 932.
During the production function survey, participants were given three sets of
questionnaires. The first set was a priming questionnaire, which asked them
questions designed to ensure that participants were able to understand and use
percentage terms. The second set of questionnaire was designed to test their
knowledge about the externality of dog vaccination. The third set of question-
naire was the production function survey itself.
To determine the shape of the production function, each participant was asked
to respond to a graphical/visual questionnaire. Each participant was presented
with a sheet with a grid containing 20 cells. Each cell contained 10 dog-logos
representing the total number of dogs in the participants’ village. Each dog
was either highlighted black, meaning that the dog had not been vaccinated,
or green, meaning that the dog had been vaccinated. Each cell represented
scenarios in which 0%, 10%, 20%,... or 100% of the dogs were vaccinated.
Each scenario was represented by two different cells with differing distribu-
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tion of vaccinated dogs. We call these, sub-scenarios. For clarification, see
the sample survey questionnaire in the Appendix. For each cell, participants
were then asked to give a percentage rating of the chance that rabies would
be eliminated in their villages given the specified percentage of dogs vaccinated.
In order to construct production functions from this data, the data had to
be consolidated in some way. Firstly, the data was consolidated at village-level
using three methods: mean, mode and median. This allowed us to construct
three different production functions for each village, each derived using dif-
ferent consolidation methods. Secondly, the whole data was consolidated into
just one data point using the three consolidation methods again. This allowed
us to construct three production functions, each with different consolidation
methods, that represent all the data collected.
Before analysing the result of the production function survey, we had to check
the priming questionnaires to ensure that all participants were able to use
percentage terms reliably when they answered the questions related to the pro-
duction function survey. One set of questions that was asked to participants
was what is the percentage that one of their children would improve or worsen
his/her ranking in school. If their responses to both questions sum up to greater
than 100, then we presume that the participants may not have been able to
use percentage terms reliably. In this case, we drop their responses from our
analysis. Because of this, we dropped 27 participants from the analysis and we
had 905 remaining participants in our dataset.
We also checked if participants understood the externality of rabies vaccina-
tion, by asking them several related questions. Based on their responses, we
saw they generally understood that their risks of being infected with rabies
were influenced not only by their own behaviour but by the behaviour of oth-
ers too. The only unexpected response is that many seem to think that even
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if many of their neighbours vaccinate their dogs against rabies, but they do
not, they are still at high risk from rabies. This may be explained by the fact
that many people in that area were farmers who tend to have to make long
commutes which means that they may be exposed to many dogs, not just their
neighbours’. See Appendix for a summary of the responses that we received to
this set of questionnaire.
Figure 3.7 shows the perceived shapes of the production function of rabies
elimination based on three different methods of data consolidation. Each grey
line in the graphs represent the perceived production function of a single vil-
lage. The dark line in each graph represents the production function when
all data from each participant was consolidated. Figure 3.7 shows that when
combining all data together, the shape of the production function is s-shape,
but very close to linearity, especially at the upper-end. At village-level the
shape of the production function is also generally s-shape but very close to a
linear function. The only exception is when Mode was used as a consolidation
method, that we see some stronger cases of s-shape production functions at
village-level.
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Figure 3.7: Shape of Rabies Elimination Production Function Based on Differ-
ent Consolidation Methods
(a) Consolidation method: Mean (b) Consolidation method: Mode
(c) Consolidation method: Median
Data Collection Tools
The following are the set of questions used during the survey:
Priming questionnaires:
Answer the following questions using percentage terms.
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1. At what percentage, do you think it will rain tomorrow?
2. At what percentage, do you think the oldest child in school in your house-
hold would improve his rank over last year?
3. At what percentage, do you think the same child would worsen his rank
compared to last year?
4. At what percentage, do you think at least one of your household members
will get malaria in the next 6 months?
5. At what percentage, do you think at least one of your dogs will get
infected with rabies in the next 6 months?
Rabies vaccination externality questionnaires:
Answer the following questions using percentage terms.
1. If all your neighbours vaccinate their dogs against rabies, but you do not,
what is the chance that at least one of your family members get bitten
by a rabid dog?
2. If you are the only person vaccinating your dogs in your village, what is
the chance that your neighbour get bitten by a rabid dog?
3. If you are the only person vaccinating your dogs in your village, what is
the chance that at least one of your family members get bitten by a rabid
dog?
4. If everyone in your village vaccinates their dogs, what is the chance that
at least one of your family members get bitten by a rabid dog?
5. If no one in your village vaccinates their dogs, what is the chance that at
least one of your family members get bitten by a rabid dog?
Production Function survey
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Determining	the	shape	of	the	production	function	
	
Suppose	10	dogs	represent	all	dogs	 in	your	village.	 	 	 	 	 	 represent	those	vaccinated	against	
rabies	and										represent	those	not	vaccinated.	In	each	case,	in	percentage	terms,	describe	
the	chance	that	rabies	is	eliminated	from	your	village.	Also,	suppose	that	you	have	to	pay	a	
fixed	cost	of	1000	TZS	to	vaccinate	your	dogs,	 indicate	whether	you	would	vaccinate	your	
dogs.	
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Summary of Responses to Rabies Vaccination Externality Question-
naire
Note that all histograms presented blow show the frequency or the number of
participants use a particular percentage term as their response to the respective
questions in the externality questionnaires.
(a) Responses to Question 1 (b) Responses to Question 2
(c) Responses to Question 3 (d) Responses to Question 4
(e) Responses to Question 5
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Chapter 4
Raising Participation in Rabies
Vaccination Campaigns:
Evidence from Tanzania
4.1 Introduction
The production of public goods is crucial in many developmental contexts.
Many times, it requires collective action. Community members need to work
together to build infrastructures, protect forests and fishes and improve overall
livelihoods of the whole community (for examples, see Bardhan (2000), Gau-
tam (2006), Jentoft and Finstad (2018), Siegal et al., (2009)). In some cases,
governments or local authorities take the initiative to produce some of the pub-
lic goods. But in many cases, it still requires collective action from community
members. In his seminal work, Olson (1965) argued that self-interested indi-
viduals would fail to work together to produce a collective good. Experimental
work do not always show such extreme result, but in many cases there are clear
underproduction of public goods.
In the context of public health, the elimination of infectious diseases can be
a priceless asset to many communities. If a disease is completely eliminated,
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community members do not have to spend time and resources dealing with
the disease, they do not have to fear getting infected. Infectious diseases can
easily be eliminated if a large enough proportion of the community is protected
against it, so that herd immunity is achieved (Fine et al., 1993). This means
that vaccine-preventable diseases can be easily eliminated as long as enough
members of the community is vaccinated. Clearly, this involves collective effort
from community members and a lack of participation from community mem-
bers results in the persistence of the disease.
In this experiment, we examine the elimination of rabies. Rabies is a viral
disease that causes around 59,000 human deaths per year (Hampson et al.,
2015). The global annual cost of the disease is estimated to be around $530
million dollars (Schwiff et al., 2013). Most human deaths from rabies occur in
marginalised communities, especially in Asia and Africa (Knobel et al., 2005).
Hence eliminating rabies can bring a significant economic benefit to developing
countries.
Humans can contract rabies through bites from infected animals. Once symp-
toms of rabies occur, it is invariably fatal. In most cases, transmissions of
rabies to humans result from domestic dog bites (WHO, 2013). Infection and
deaths can be prevented in bite victims through timely administration of post-
exposure prophylaxis (PEP). However, for those in marginalised communities,
access to PEP is still an issue. Even if accessible, PEP may still be unafford-
able to those who need it (Hampson et al., 2008). Canine rabies vaccination
has been proven to be a cost-effective method to reduce human deaths from
rabies. Successful canine rabies vaccination campaigns have been shown to
reduce bites by suspected rabid dogs and the demand for PEP (Cleaveland et
al., 2003) and even to eliminate rabies completely.
Rabies can be eliminated from a dog population if at least 70% of the pop-
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ulation is vaccinated (Coleman and Dye, 1996). Once elimination is achieved,
the main source of infection to humans is also removed and hence the risk of
rabies. Canine rabies vaccination campaigns carried out in many parts of the
world have been shown to successfully control rabies (Cleaveland et al., 2003,
Schneider et al., 2007, Vigilato et al., 2013). However, the 70% vaccination
threshold is not always achieved, even in communities most at risk from rabies,
leading to disease persistence. Reasons for the failure to achieve this target
may pertain to the supply side (failure to supply and administer vaccines or do
so effectively) or the demand side (failure by community members to partici-
pate in vaccination campaigns) or both. This research focuses on dealing with
the latter issue by investigating some advertising interventions to raise demand
for rabies vaccines. However, during this research, we also found some sugges-
tive evidence that some operational changes that ease access to vaccination
campaigns could increase participation significantly. This evidence will also be
discussed in detail along with that related to the advertising interventions.
Many policies have been used to motivate participation in rabies vaccination
campaigns, but not all were successful. Minyoo et al., (2015) provided incen-
tives (dog collars and owner wristbands) to participants of vaccination cam-
paigns in northern Tanzania. They showed that these incentives were effective
in increasing participation, although the increase was not enough to reach the
70% threshold. Cleaton et al., (2018) used mobile phone text messaging to
alert community members about vaccination campaigns in two communities in
Haiti. They showed that those who received the alert were twice more likely
to participate in the vaccination campaigns than those who did not.
Our research tests the effectiveness of two advertising interventions in increas-
ing participation in vaccination campaigns: text messaging (similar to that
used in Cleaton et al., (2018)), and religious and tribal leaders1. We hypoth-
1Tribal leaders refer to leaders of Maasai communities
78
esise that these interventions work in the following ways. Text messaging can
be used to provide community members with all relevant information about
the vaccination campaigns, is a more personal approach of communication and
additional information to make the risk and danger of rabies more salient to
them and attract their attention to the problem of rabies elimination. Text
messaging may also have the potential to reach more people than other routine
advertisement methods such as posters or loudspeakers. The use of religious
and tribal leaders can similarly spread information about the vaccination cam-
paigns, but they can be uniquely effective due to the authority and leadership
that they hold in communities. Several literatures, such as by Vedeld (2000)
and Glowacki and von Rueden (2015) have proven the potential effectiveness
of leadership in dealing with collective action problem. We hypothesise that
the use of religious/tribal leaders can increase participation through a similar
mechanism.
The study by Cleaton et al., (2018) is the only known study in the litera-
ture to have used mobile phone text messaging to advertise rabies vaccination
campaigns and that demonstrably increased participation in Haiti. We do not
know of any study that looks at the use of religious and tribal leaders (or
other leadership type) in advertising rabies vaccination campaigns. However,
the role of leaders in planning vaccination campaigns has been shown to be
important in achieving high vaccination coverage (Le´chenne et al., (2016)) and
uptake of vaccines in general (Nasiru et al., (2012) and Goldstein et al., (2015)).
We found no evidence that either of the advertising interventions alone were
effective in increasing participation in our vaccination campaigns, which is con-
trary to what was found by Cleaton et al., (2018). However, we found evidence
that both interventions were effective in increasing participation when they
were used in conjunction with each other. We argue further that contextual
and environmental factors could have influenced this outcome. We also found
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strong evidence that operational changes to how vaccination campaigns were
delivered could have a significant impact on participation in vaccination cam-
paigns and they could also influence the effectiveness or at least the observable
effectiveness of the advertising interventions.
This study can also form a contribution to the literature on public good exper-
iments. In the existing literature, public good experiments tend to take place
in controlled laboratory conditions. Chaudhuri (2011) provided a survey of a
wide range of literature that identified key factors that influence participation
in public good games. Ledyard (1995) identified communication and marginal
per capita contribution as some of the influencing factors. Andreoni and Petrie
(2004) and showed that revelation of identities could have a positive effect on
participation. Bochet et al. (2006) showed that face-to-face communication
is about just as effective as anonymous verbal communication, and the use
of punishments can increase participation but it has little effect on efficiency
due to its cost. These laboratory experiments rely on controlled conditions to
identify factors influencing participation. There have been little literature that
are based on field experiments. Many of the empirical studies that take place
in the field similarly try to identify influencing factors instead of looking at
effective interventions (for example, Bardhan (2000)). Our study differ from
these studies by looking at interventions instead of influencing factors. In ad-
dition, the fact that it takes place in a less controlled environment means that
it can provide a more general understanding to how the interventions influence
participation in real world settings.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. The next section discusses the
methodology and all activities performed during the experiment. Section 3
gives a brief description of key data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
discusses the implication of the results and concludes.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Study Area
To decide on the size of our sample, we conducted a simulation-based power
analysis. In the power analysis, we started by generating a normal random
variable of size n with mean 50% and a standard deviation of 5%, where n
represents the sample size or number of villages and each entry in the variable
represents the vaccination coverage of each village. We assumed that, on av-
erage, each intervention increases the vaccination coverage of each village by
10 percentage point. We also assumed that the vaccination coverage is sub-
jected to a noise term with mean zero and a standard deviation of 12 percentage
points. We also set a threshold for the p-value of the coefficient of the interven-
tions at 0.05 or less. Based on these assumptions, we ran 1000 simulations and
found that we need a sample size of 56 villages to obtain a power of just over 0.8.
The 56 villages were selected from the Morogoro Rural district of Tanzania
(based on the 2012 population census, the district had a population of 286,248
and the sampled villages had a combined population of 122,945 or just under
43% of the district’s population). The Morogoro Rural District was selected
as it had existing infrastructure that can support canine rabies vaccination
campaigns and there had been no known study on policy interventions, which
could contaminate our data. The villages were selected randomly from a larger
set of 93 villages in the district with confirmed permanent mobile phone net-
work. Figure 4.1 provides a mapping of the study area, with each villages
colour coded by their experimental group. Coloured grey in the primary map
in Figure 4.1 is part of the Mikumi national park which is an uninhabited area.
The experiment took place between November 2017 and February 2018.
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Figure 4.1: Mapping of Study Area
4.2.2 Experimental Design
The primary objective of the study was to determine the effectiveness of two
advertising interventions, namely text messaging and religious/tribal leaders,
on participation in vaccination campaign. To do this, we had a factorial ex-
perimental design. We divided the sampled villages randomly into four equal
groups receiving different combinations of the interventions (plus routine adver-
tising): routine advertising only, religious/tribal leaders plus routine advertis-
ing, text messaging plus routine advertising and both advertising interventions
plus routine advertising. We then analyse for the effect of the interventions
between the four experimental groups. We also explored the potential effect of
operational changes on vaccination coverage.
Our unit of analysis in this experiment is the villages instead of individuals.
The main reason for this is that analysis at individual level is prone to con-
tamination as individuals can inform each other about the interventions that
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they are exposed to. Setting the unit of analysis at village level minimises this
as the likelihood of contamination across village is smaller due to the distances
between village. In addition, analysis at village level provides more insight for
collective behaviour, which is the topic of our interest.
4.2.3 Pre-Intervention Activities
Prior to implementing the advertising interventions, workshops were conducted
with participants from 43 of the 56 villages2. From each village, a village leader,
a veterinary officer (if there was one stationed in the village) and a health official
(nurse or medical attendant) were invited. The purpose of the workshops were
to identify any potential issue that might impede the implementation of the
advertising interventions, and to seek local advice on potential improvements
to the study design and the vaccination campaigns more generally. Workshop
participants were first asked about their experience with past rabies vaccination
campaigns, including challenges encountered. After detailing the plan related
to the advertising interventions to be tested, they were encouraged to provide
feedback on the design and any potential impediment they envisaged.
Those workshops identified issues encountered in the previous vaccination cam-
paigns and resulted in a few operational changes to the delivery of the vacci-
nation campaigns (to be discussed below). Participants in the workshops were
also helpful in designing the overall design of the intervention. Specifically,
they helped design the structure and appearance of the content of the text
messages, the timing for when the texts should be sent and they also identified
potential problems related to the intervention.
2The remaining 13 villages were not able to participate in the workshops because of
accessibility problems. However, district veterinary officers who were familiar with those
villages were present during the workshops and were able to provide all necessary information
needed during the workshop.
83
Focus group discussions were conducted in 5 of the selected villages comprising
a total of 47 villagers. Participants were mostly ordinary community members.
The ultimate objective of these discussions was to produce a locally-relevant
message to be tested in the advertising interventions, although the overall de-
sign of the study was also addressed. The focus group discussions started with
a general discussion on rabies. Participants experience with the disease was
assessed. Feedback on the anticipated design of the study was sought. Specifi-
cally, participants were asked how to ensure that text messages would attract
attention and make the risk of rabies salient to the recipients. The design of the
text messaging intervention was a result of these discussions and is described
in the next subsection.
Phone numbers of villagers in villages assigned to receive the text messages
were collected manually. They were first collected from village leaders in the
first set of workshops. Afterwards, a team of officials were asked to go to each
of the villages and collect as many phone numbers as they could. The phone
numbers were then recorded and sorted by village name in Excel files and im-
ported into a mass text messaging platform Rasello3.
A specific workshop was also conducted with a group of 8 community leaders
(two village leaders, one Muslim leader, three Christian leaders from differ-
ent denominations (Pentecost, Tanzania Assembly of God and Lutheran) and
two Maasai tribal leaders). All leaders were from villages outside the sampled
villages to avoid them taking their own initiatives to advertise the vaccination
campaigns without our invitation, which could affect the outcome of the exper-
iment if their villages were included in the sample. This workshop started with
a general discussion on rabies and rabies vaccination campaigns to familiarise
the participants with the problem. This was then followed by a discussion on
the roles that they could play in advertising rabies vaccination campaigns and
3Rasello was a mass text messaging platform run by a private company in Tanzania.
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we were assured that their participation in our experiment did not contradict
their beliefs or tradition in anyway. The design of the religious/tribal leaders
intervention is described in the next subsection.
4.2.4 Advertising Interventions and Other Advertisement
The design of the text messaging intervention was as follows. All phone num-
bers collected earlier were sent the following text messages according to their
villages (in Swahili):
“VILLAGE NAME: Recently, in a neighbouring village to yours,
a child died a painful death after being bitten by a rabid dog. You
and your neighbours can protect your children by vaccinating your
dogs. Dog vaccines in VILLAGE NAME will be provided for
free at LOCATION(S) on Saturday 20/01/2018 between 8am to
4pm.”
The choice to start the texts with the respective villages’ names was to make
the recipients of the texts feel that the text message was regarding some issue
relevant to their respective villages. The brief account on the recent human
death from rabies was to make the risk of rabies salient to the text recipients4.
The final sentence in the text was simply to inform text recipients about the
timing and location of the vaccination campaigns and to ensure that they know
that the vaccines were provided for free.
This message was sent to those phone numbers five days, three days and one
day before the vaccination campaign day. This was to ensure that villagers had
enough time to consider and get prepared to bring their dogs to the vaccination
points. The text messages were sent at around 4pm on the days they were due
to be sent. This was because 4pm was the time when villagers would have com-
pleted their daily work and meet and interact with one another. The design
4The account was based on a real event.
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of this intervention, including the content of the text messages and timing for
when the texts were sent, was the result of the workshops and the focus group
discussions discussed above. The mass text messaging platform (Rasello) indi-
cated that 88% of the texts were successfully delivered.
The design of the religious/tribal leaders intervention was the result of the
workshop with the community leaders and was as follows. The identities of
religious and tribal leaders in each of the sampled villages assigned to receive
the religious/tribal leaders intervention were collected by the district veterinary
officer. Each of the religious and tribal leaders were then sent a letter inviting
them to advertising the vaccination campaigns one week before vaccination day.
The letter provided all details related to the vaccination campaigns including
the location and opening time of the vaccination station(s) in their respective
villages. Included in the letter also was a guided message that the religious and
tribal leaders could use to inform their community members:
“To eliminate rabies from our village and to protect our family and
friends from rabies, it is important that we all bring our dogs to
be vaccinated in the upcoming vaccination campaign. If all dogs in
our village are protected against rabies, then we won’t be at risk of
contracting the deadly disease. Vaccinating your dogs against rabies
is the right thing to do. The next rabies vaccination campaign will
take place in our village on Saturday the 20/01/2018 at LOCA-
TION(S) between 8am to 4pm”.
It was made clear to them that the message above was a guided example only
and that they had the freedom to use any other message that they think is ap-
propriate. It was only important that they informed their community members
of the timing and location of the vaccination campaigns and that the vaccines
would be provided for free. All religious and tribal leaders were also sent text
messages reminding them to advertise the vaccination campaigns. We know
that the religious leaders tend to meet with their congregation more regularly
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than normal. Based on the workshop with the religious leaders, we know that
all religious groups meet at least once during the weekdays and there tend to be
regular interactions between religious leaders and their community outside reli-
gious activities. Evidence from data collected after the vaccination campaigns
showed sufficient evidence that the religious and tribal leaders of villages as-
signed to receive the intervention advertised as we expected.
In addition to the advertising interventions, routine advertising were also used
in all 56 villages. These included posters, loudspeakers and the use of local
village/sub-village administrative leaders. All advertising methods provided
information on the location and timing of the vaccination campaigns and that
the vaccines were provided for free. Posters were placed in prominent places of
each village such as schools, markets and town halls around one week before
the vaccination date and left there until at least the day after the vaccination
day. Local village and sub-village chiefs or chairpersons were also asked to be
involved in the advertising of the vaccination campaigns. Prior to this, vacci-
nators and other officials involved were instructed on how to carry out these
routine advertisements and the vaccination campaigns themselves. Note that
the routine advertising was not part of the advertising interventions and they
were used in all of the sampled villages as a baseline advertising method only.
4.2.5 Vaccination Campaigns and Post-Campaign Ac-
tivities
Vaccination campaigns were conducted in all 56 villages after the interventions
were implemented. The vaccination strategy that we used was central point
strategy (as described in Kaare et al., (2009)). At least one vaccination point
was placed in each village and villagers were asked to bring their dogs to one
of these points. As a result of workshop discussions we also made several sig-
nificant changes to how the vaccination campaigns were delivered compared to
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the campaigns in the years before. Those changes were as follows.
Firstly, we ensured that at least one vaccination station was placed in each
sub-village. This was to maximise consistency and ensure that there was no
bias between large and small villages in terms of the average distance that
community members had to travel to reach the closest vaccination point. In
the previous campaigns, there was no such policy of stationing a vaccination
station at sub-village level. Secondly, the vaccination stations were open all day
long. In the previous campaigns, stations were generally open for half a day
only, so that vaccinators could move from one station to another to cover more
geographical area. By opening the vaccination stations all day long, we ensured
that there was no bias between villages that had vaccination stations opened
in the morning or in the afternoon. Thirdly, as discussed above, advertisement
started one week before the campaigns and continued throughout the week, in-
stead of just for one day before. From now on, we refer to these three changes
as operational changes. These changes were made for research purposes only,
to ensure consistency but in the understanding that they could have had a
major impact on participation. It has been shown in other studies that these
changes could potentially have a large impact on participation (Castillo-Neyra
et al., 2017, Castillo-Neyra et al., 2019). As expected, we found some sugges-
tive evidence that these changes had a significant impact on participation and
it could have affected the effectiveness of the advertising interventions (text
messaging and religious/tribal leaders) as well. The effect of the operational
changes will be discussed in detail in the next two sections.
At selected vaccination points, those who brought their dogs for vaccination
were asked to complete a short survey questionnaire. The survey was to collect
data on how the attendants learned about the vaccination campaigns or what
advertisement methods they were exposed to. For more information, see Table
4.5 in the Appendix.
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To estimate vaccination coverage, the vaccinators were asked to conduct tran-
sects in their respective villages or sub-villages in the evening after the vaccina-
tion campaigns (as described by Kaare et al., (2009) and Sambo et al., (2017)).
Dogs that were vaccinated at the vaccination stations were marked with a
coloured collar. In the same evening of the vaccination day, after the vaccina-
tion points were closed, vaccinators travelled through their respective villages
or sub-villages and counted the number of dogs with and without collars. The
estimated vaccination coverage was calculated by dividing the number of dogs
observed with collars by the total number of dogs seen during the transect.
The week after the vaccination campaigns, village-level questionnaires were
administered to village leaders (either village chairperson or executive) in the
sampled villages to collect village-level socio-economic data and other variables
that could have influenced vaccination coverage. The questionnaire included
information on access to basic needs and facilities and experiences and atti-
tudes towards rabies and previous vaccination campaigns. The interviews also
allowed us to check whether the advertisements and the interventions were im-
plemented as intended. These questionnaires were needed since official village-
level data was limited, however it also means that a lot of the data relied on
the village leaders’ knowledge of the variables of interest. See Appendix for the
questionnaire administered to village leaders.
Household questionnaires were administered and completed within five weeks
of the vaccination campaigns. In each village, a target of 20 households were
randomly selected to answer the questionnaires. A total of 1,114 households’
data were retained after data processing. The questionnaires were adminis-
tered to the head of each household or, if the head was not present, the most
senior adult (at least 18 years old). If no adult was present, the household was
unselected and another household was selected to replace it. The questionnaire
89
collected data on the household socio-economic status (based on the United
Nation Development Programme’s multidimensional poverty index (Kovacevic
and Calderon, (2014))), general and health locus of control, participation in
the most rabies vaccination campaigns, and attitudes towards and knowledge
about rabies in general. Note however, that even though data on the geo-
graphic location of each household was collected, which meant that we could
have calculated the distance between each household to their nearest vaccina-
tion station, the data could not be used as we later discovered that there were
technical errors in the collection of the data. See Appendix for the question-
naire.
Since we believe that rabies elimination is a public good, we believe that par-
ticipation in rabies vaccination campaigns can be associated with a village’s
underlying ability to coordinate and participate in collective action. Therefore,
we decided to create an indicator for collective action at village-level. To create
the indicator, the same households which participated in the household-level
questionnaires were asked to engage in a small experiment. We call this a
cash experiment. All participants were given 5,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS)
(equivalent to 1.68 GBP) and they could choose to either return the cash (par-
ticipate in “collective action”) or keep the cash (refuse to participate in the
“collective action”). If at least 14 out of 20 participants in the village re-
turned the cash, then all participants within the same village were rewarded
with 20,000 TZS (equivalent to 6.72 USD). Otherwise, there was no reward
and those who returned the 5,000 TZS, would lose the cash. The index for
a village’s willingness to participate in collective action was the proportion of
participants who returned the cash. The index would be used in the regres-
sion analyses as control for village-level propensity to participate in collective
action only. Our hypothesis was that there would be some correlation between
the indicator and participation in the vaccination campaigns. Villages with
higher propensity to participate in collective action would be more likely to
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have higher vaccination coverage rate, provided villagers understand that ra-
bies elimination requires them to collectively vaccinate their dogs.
Follow-up in-depth interviews were conducted with 16 interviewees selected
from the group of participants who were interviewed in the household ques-
tionnaire. To ensure that we could obtain some insights from different groups
of people, the interviewees were chosen based on the interventions they were
exposed to and their decision to participate or not. Specifically, interviewees
who received any of the interventions were asked if the interventions affected
their decision to participate in the vaccination campaigns. Interviewees, who
did not participate in the vaccination campaigns and were not exposed to the
interventions, were asked whether the interventions could have affected their
decision had they been exposed to the advertising interventions, and whether
other factors prohibited them from participating. The effects of the operational
changes were also explored as well as further modifications to the field proto-
cols that could have facilitated these processes further. The interviewees were
specifically asked if any of those operational changes made it easier for them to
participate in the vaccination campaigns and if there were other changes that
could have been made to improve the campaigns further. See Appendix for the
key questions asked during the interviews.
4.2.6 Data Analysis
To identify the effect of the interventions on participation in the vaccination
campaigns, we used Generalised Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) with logit link
function. The use of GLMM regression models is considered appropriate for our
data as it addresses several issues. Firstly, the dependent variable (estimated
vaccination coverage) is bounded between 0 and 1. Secondly, the estimation
of vaccination coverage using transect is likely to be very noisy, especially for
those villages with low dog counts. GLMM address this issue in two ways: it
allows us to use weighted regressions which put relatively more weight on vil-
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lages with high dog counts during transects and relatively less weight on those
with low dog counts. This then allows us to use all 56 villages in our sample,
instead of discarding villages with low dog counts. In addition, we could in-
clude village-level random effects in the model which can cushion the effects of
noise in the transect estimates of vaccination coverage and the lack of reliable
village-level data, which could affect the regression analyses.
In the GLMM models, we used estimated vaccination coverage of each vil-
lage as proxy for its participation rate in the vaccination campaigns. We used
a variable called text messaging coverage as proxy for the text messaging in-
tervention. Specifically, text messaging coverage of a village is the number of
phone numbers collected in that village divided by its estimated number of
households. The estimated number of households of a village is the population
size of the village divided by the average household size. Therefore the text
messaging coverage is a number between 0 and 1. It is a better proxy than
a dummy variable because it also captures the varying extent to which the
text messaging intervention was implemented in each village. As proxy for the
religious/tribal leaders intervention, I used a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 if a village received the intervention. A lot of the variables obtained
from the village-level data were used in constructing GLMM regression models,
but a lot of them were discarded because they made no improvement to the
models, in terms of the AIC criterion and they provided little additional insight
into how they could influence participation in the vaccination campaigns.
This research was not designed to identify the effect of the operational changes
to the vaccination campaigns (discussed above) on participation in the cam-
paigns. However, during the experiment we found some suggestive evidence
that strongly suggested that the operational changes had a significant impact
on participation. To identify the effect of the operational changes, we first
used paired t-tests to compare the vaccination coverage of our vaccination
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campaigns with those of 2014 and 2016. This could reliably be done because
vaccination coverage estimation of those years were also done using transect.
Note, however, that the 2014 transect data was available for only 29 of the 56
sampled villages and 2016 transect data was available for only 33 villages. We
then collated the vaccination coverage data that we have from those years with
those of the year 2018 to create a larger dataset of 118 observations and used
GLMM regression (as described above) to identify the effect of the operational
changes and the advertising interventions on participation in the vaccination
campaigns. The only difference in this case is that we included random effects
at both village-level and observational level. The only known village level dif-
ferences between the three years were the implementation of the advertising
interventions and the operational changes. Therefore we acknowledge that the
results of these analysis need to be interpreted with caution as it lacks data
on other village-level variables that could have affected participation and could
have changed between 2014, 2016 and 2018.
All qualitative data was recorded, transcribed and translated into English for
analysis. To analyse the qualitative data, we used thematic analysis method
to identify all the key patterns and themes within the data.
4.3 Data Description
In this section, I provide descriptive statistics of key variables that could have
had an impact on vaccination coverage. All data used in this study was col-
lected by our research team, with only the exception of the data on village
population size which was taken from the 2012 population census.
The different experimental groups are comparable because most of the sam-
pled villages shared many socio-economic traits and for traits with larger vari-
ation across the sample, there is sufficient representation across all experimental
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groups. Firstly, almost all villages relied on crops as their primary source of in-
come, with only one village whose village leader described livestock as their pri-
mary source of income. For secondary income source, they were about equally
divided between livestock and commercial activities. Most of the sampled vil-
lages had an issue with access to basic needs. All villages had basic health
facilities at dispensary level, but only 3 villages had health centres within their
village. 48 out of 53 remaining villages had health centres within a 2-hour
walk, while the other 5 villages within a 4-hour walk. All villages had difficulty
accessing clean water, most villagers in all villages had to collect water manu-
ally. 50 of the 56 villages had livestock field officers5 assigned to their villages.
The only socio-economic factor that differed significantly between villages was
their population sizes. Using data from 2012, the population size of the villages
ranged from just over 450 to almost 6000, they average at about 2200. How-
ever, there was sufficient representation of villages from varying sizes in each
experimental group. The mean population size of each experimental group was
no more than half a standard deviation away from the sample mean. Another
socio-economic indicator was created using the cash experiment described in
the previous section. Results of the experiment showed that only 3 villages
succeeded in the “collective action” and on average, approximately 39% of the
participants chose to participate in the “collective action”.
The sampled villages also shared similar experience and attitudes towards
dog ownership, rabies and rabies vaccination campaigns. Dogs were gener-
ally treated in similar ways. The primary reason for owning dogs were for
them to guard houses, crops or livestock. Our household questionnaire showed
that more than 90% of respondents kept dogs for these reasons. In case of a
dog biting humans, most of the villagers described killing the dogs and getting
the owner to compensate the victim for post-exposure prophylaxis as the most
5Livestock field officers are government officials given the task of advising villagers on how
to keep their domestic animals and livestock safe.
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typical response. All villages had experience with canine rabies vaccination
campaigns before our campaigns. During our campaigns, vaccination stations
were placed in relatively similar locations, such as schools, markets and town
halls. When asked about the locations of our vaccination stations, all village
leaders, except one, said that the locations could not have been improved.
Hence, we believe that the placing of our vaccination stations were optimised.
One key variable that affected the effectiveness of the first intervention was
the text messaging coverage of each village. There was considerable variation
in the text messaging coverage, with the minimum and the maximum coverage
at 18% and 97%, respectively, and the mean of almost 50%6. Villages with
larger population size tended to have lower text messaging coverage than those
with smaller population size. This was because it was harder to collect a large
number of phone numbers in larger villages. Text messaging coverage will be
used as an index for the extent to which this intervention was implemented in
each village.
To quantify how well these advertising methods reached their intended audi-
ence, we conducted questionnaires at vaccination stations and with household
heads on information sources about the dog vaccination campaign (see Tables
4.4 and 4.5, respectively, in Appendix). There were in total 935 attendants
interviewed at selected vaccination stations. However only data from 887 of
the attendants were usable, the others had to be discarded as invalid as they
did not specify how they learned about the vaccination campaigns. There were
in total 1,114 respondents to the household questionnaires.
There are some key similar patterns in both set of data. Firstly, neither of
the advertising interventions were primary source of information for the re-
spondents. Only about 11% of respondents in the vaccination station surveys
6These figures exclude the villages that did not receive the first intervention.
95
Figure 4.2: Estimated Vaccination Coverage by Experimental Group
said at least one of the advertising interventions were their only sources of
information. The corresponding figure is much lower at less than 2% in the
household questionnaires. Secondly, routine advertising and word-of-mouth
were still the most important source of information for most villagers. More
than 88% of the respondents to vaccination station survey said that they were
made aware of the campaigns through routine advertising or other villagers.
The corresponding figure is much higher in household questionnaires, at 98%.
4.4 Result
4.4.1 The Effect of the Advertising Interventions
The vaccination campaigns took place on the 20th of January 2018. A total of
3,256 dogs within the sampled villages were vaccinated. Figure 4.2 presents a
comparison of mean vaccination coverage of all experimental groups. Villages
that received both the text messaging and the religious/tribal leaders adver-
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tising had the overall highest vaccination coverage, at approximately 70% (see
Figure 4.2). Surprisingly, the group receiving the text messaging intervention
plus routine advertising had the lowest average estimated vaccination coverage
at around 50%. The group with only routine advertising and religious/tribal
leaders plus routine advertising had average estimated vaccination coverage at
60% and 65% respectively. From these figures, the effect of each intervention
remains unclear.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of our GLMM regression analyses with esti-
mated vaccination coverage as the dependent variable and a list of indepen-
dent variables on the far-left column. In Model 1, only the coefficient for Re-
ligious/Tribal Leaders was statistically significant and positive, which means
that we only have evidence that religious and tribal leaders had a positive effect
on participation in the vaccination campaigns. However, this result changed
when the interaction term for the two advertising interventions (Text Messag-
ing Coverage*Religious/Tribal Leaders) was included in the regression (Models
2 and 3), and the coefficient for Religious/Tribal Leaders lost statistical signif-
icance whilst the interaction term was statistically significant. This indicated
that Model 1, which did not include the interaction term, incorrectly captured
the effect of the interaction term as that of the religious and tribal leaders. The
coefficient for Text Messaging Coverage also gained statistical significance at
10% level, and was negative. The positive coefficient of the interaction term
outweighs the negative coefficient of mobile phone text messaging, which means
that when used together, both interventions should generate an overall positive
outcome.
Regarding other variables, the coefficient for the presence of livestock field
officers is positive and statistically significant at 10% level in both Model 2
and Model 3. As expected, this indicates that livestock field officers had a role
to play in increasing vaccination coverage. The coefficient for the presence of
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Table 4.1: Village-Level Regression Results
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Text Messaging (TM) Coverage -0.1023 -1.0439* -1.0391*
(0.4162) (0.6116) (0.6067)
Religious/Tribal Leaders 0.4601** 0.0429 0.0518
(0.2329) (0.3011) (0.2986)
Pastoralist Presence -0.2594 -0.3191 -0.2778
(0.2454) (0.2404) (0.2421)
Livestock Field Officer Presence 0.4803 0.6931* 0.7376*
(0.3995) (0.4020) (0.4015)
Collective Action Indicator -0.6769
(0.7152)
TM Coverage*Religious/Tribal Leaders 1.7399** 1.6772**
(0.8405) (0.8353)
AIC 283.9 281.7 282.8
BIC 296.0 295.8 299.0
Number of Observations 56 56 56
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level
Numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the coefficient.
The dependent variable is the estimated vaccination coverage.
pastoralist communities is negative as expected, but it is not statistically signif-
icant. Model 3 includes a variable called Collective Action Indicator, which is
an index for a village’s collective ability to overcome collective action problem,
as generated from the cash experiment. Its coefficient is not statistically signif-
icant, which indicates that either the result of the cash experiment was not a
good indicator for collective action or, if it was, that the villagers did not con-
sider participating in the vaccination campaigns as participating in a collective
action, or that the indicator was a wrong measure of people’s tendency to con-
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tribute to a health-related public good. Several other variables based on data
collected from village leaders were also used to estimate the models, but were
not retained in the models because they did not improve the models in any way.
These results suggest that there was no evidence that either of the interven-
tions on their own had a positive effect on vaccination coverage, but there was
evidence that, when used in conjunction with each other, they had a positive
impact. Follow-up in-depth interviews conducted with local villagers provided
some explanation for this. In interviews conducted with 16 randomly selected
villagers, 9 received the text messaging intervention. Of these, 5 interviewees
mentioned that they needed some kind of confirmation through other infor-
mation sources before they believed the authenticity of the text messages. To
quote one of the interviewees:
“(When) the text came before the campaign, I didn’t think anything
of it, but after two or three days, some people came advertising
on loudspeakers about the campaign,..., realising the text was also
related to this, I said to myself I must vaccinate my dogs”.
Local village/sub-village leaders and officials as well as other advertisement
methods were mentioned amongst the other sources of confirmation. This is
consistent with the findings of the analysis whereby text messaging and reli-
gious/tribal leader interventions combined to produce a positive effect. Other
factors that was mentioned by the interviewees to may have impeded the effect
of text messaging included illiteracy and weak phone signal.
Despite these results, the qualitative data also provided some positive feed-
backs related to text messaging. Specifically, we found some evidence that the
anecdote about the recent case of human death from rabies was especially effec-
tive when text recipients could relate the case to themselves or to their family.
Two interviewees explicitly mentioned that the content of the text message
made them feel differently about the risk of rabies. One said:
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“... when you receive a text like this and when you look back at
home, you realize you have dogs and kids, you will definitely take
your dog for vaccination”.
Another interviewee said:
“the reported kid who died from rabies was my grandson7... people
were referring to the case in their conversations. ... very few people
didn’t vaccinate their dogs, the majority of them were sensitised by
the texts.”
These excerpts showed that the content of text messaging could indeed make
the risk of rabies salient to the text recipients and attract their attention.
While qualitative data provided some insight into why the text messaging in-
tervention needed religious/tribal leaders to produce a positive effect, it did
not explain why the latter were ineffective on their own, nor did it explain
the mechanism through which religious/tribal leaders motivated community
members to participate in the vaccination campaigns. We obtained evidence
that community members support the use of religious/tribal leaders. Several
studies such as by Nasiru et al., (2013) and Goldstein et al., (2015) similarly
showed that leaders, including religious leaders, were effective in reducing vac-
cine hesitancy and increasing vaccination uptake. Therefore, we are confident
that the use of religious/tribal leaders had a positive effect in some way. How-
ever, community members did not seem to take special interest in the fact
that information regarding vaccination campaigns came from religious/tribal
leaders. We found no evidence that religious/tribal leaders were able to raise
participation through the mechanism hypothesised in the introduction, namely
through overcoming collective action problem.
7This was not necessarily true. The case in the text refers to a specific case that happened
in another village that was not included in our sample.
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Mean Vaccination Coverage Across Years
4.4.2 The Effect of the Operational Changes
As far as we know, the operational changes to the campaigns (described in
section 2) were implemented in the 2018 vaccination campaigns, but not in
the previous years (2014 and 2016). We are not aware of other village-level
changes, apart from the advertising interventions, that could have had a sig-
nificant impact on participation in rabies vaccination campaigns. We know
that awareness about recent rabies cases can have an impact on participation,
but we also know that human deaths have occurred in the district every year.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how mean estimated coverage in 2018 was considerably
higher in 2018 than in 2014 and 2016.
To check if there was any significant and positive difference in vaccination
coverage between 2018 and 2014, we first conducted simple one-tail paired t-
tests. Mean vaccination coverage of the 2018 campaign was significantly higher
than the campaigns in 2014 and 2016 (Table 4.2), including among the villages
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Table 4.2: One-tail paired t-tests
Coverage difference Mean Standard Sample T-value Significance
(2018-2016) Difference Error Size
All sampled villages 0.3069 0.0543 33 5.6531 Yes
Villages with 0.3050 0.1119 10 2.7248 Yes
no intervention
Coverage difference
(2018-2014)
All sampled villages 0.3282 0.0651 29 5.0376 Yes
Villages with 0.3413 0.1056 8 3.2318 Yes
no intervention
that did not receive any of the two advertising interventions.
In addition to the paired t-tests, we collated all vaccination coverage data
for all three years to create a larger dataset of 118 observations (29 observa-
tions in 2014, 33 in 2016 and 56 in 2018) and used GLMM regression with
estimated vaccination coverage as the dependent variable and the independent
variables are listed on the left column of Table 4.3. In Model 1, the coefficient
for Operational Changes was positive and statistically significant at 1% level.
Model 2 uses Year as an independent variable instead of Operational Changes.
It provides a similar result in which the coefficient of Year 2018 takes a similar
value to the coefficient of Operational Changes in Model 1.
As far as we know and according to the district veterinary officer, the opera-
tional changes had not been implemented in the previous campaigns, therefore
this is suggestive that the operational changes could have an impact on partic-
ipation. The interpretation of these results still have to proceed cautiously as
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Table 4.3: Regression Results Across Different Years
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2
TM Coverage -0.8244 -0.8250
(0.6136) (0.6144)
Religious/Tribal Leaders 0.1773 0.1772
(0.3000) (0.3003)
Operational Changes 1.2757***
(0.2403)
Year 2016 -0.0458
(0.2362)
Year 2018 1.2516***
(0.2706)
TM Coverage*Religious/Tribal Leaders 1.3663+ 1.3671+
(0.8372) (0.8383)
AIC 558.8 560.8
BIC 578.3 583.0
Number of Observations 119 119
+Significant at 10.3% level, ***Significant at 1% level
Numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the coefficients.
The dependent variable is the estimate vaccination coverage.
we do not have sufficient quantitative data to claim this result as a concrete
evidence. However, qualitative data which will be discussed below supports
the positive effect of the operational changes.
In our in-depth interviews, we also took the opportunity to ask interviewees
on their views on each of the operational changes that were made to the vac-
cination campaigns. There was general support for the operational changes,
however, other issues were also brought up during the interviews.
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One of the operational changes was stationing at least one vaccination point
in each sub-village. More than half of the interviewees mentioned that dis-
tance from vaccination points and difficulty restraining dogs or losing control
of dogs while travelling to a vaccination station as one of the general reasons
for failures to participate in vaccination campaigns. Shortening the distances
to the vaccination points at least partially helped tackle this issue by min-
imising the time that dog owners had to travel and restrain their dogs. In
addition, stationing vaccination points in sub-villages also made sub-village
leaders get involved in the advertisement of the campaigns and there is evi-
dence that sub-village leaders can have an influence on villagers’ decision to
vaccinate their dogs. One interviewee mentioned that sub-village leaders tend
to have information about dog-owners in their respective sub-villages and the
presence of sub-village leaders can also encourage other villagers to participate
in the vaccination campaigns. Despite this, around a third of the interviewees
still recommend house-to-house vaccination as a better strategy.
Another operational change was to ensure that vaccination stations were open
all day long. According to more than a third of the interviewees, having vacci-
nation stations opened for a whole day was certainly an improvement over the
previous campaigns, as it gave villagers more time and flexibility to vaccinate
their dogs. However, 9 of the interviewees believed that the vaccination cam-
paign should have been held for at least two days. It should also be noted that
longer vaccination campaigns can be costly so any additional effort in prolong-
ing the campaign should be balanced with sufficient increase in participation
from the community members.
Another change that could have affected participation was that advertisements
about the vaccination campaigns started one week before and continued until
the campaign day instead of only one day before the campaign day. According
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to 11 of the interviewees, this change helped them to prepare for the vaccination
campaigns by giving them time to restrain their dogs and make other necessary
preparation to bring their dogs to the vaccination point. Dogs in many of the
villages tend to be left to freely roam the villages, which in many cases make
it difficult for the owners to find and restrain them on time for vaccination if
the period of notice is too short. In addition, this new advertising strategy
also allowed information to travel within the villages and ensured that more
dog owners were informed than if advertising were to happen only one day
before the campaign. According to the interviews and some quantitative data
(see Appendix, Tables 4.4 and 4.5), there was evidence that villagers tend to
inform each other about the vaccination campaigns and word-of-mouth played
an important role in the transmission of information. Therefore, extending the
advertising period means not only that there were more villagers likely to be
exposed to the advertisements, but it also gave time for those not exposed to
the advertisements to be informed by other villagers.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of our analyses are as follows. Firstly, there was no statistical
evidence that each of the advertising intervention was effective in raising par-
ticipation on its own, but there was evidence that when used together, they
were effective in raising participation. However, qualitative data showed at
least a degree of support for both interventions. Secondly, we found strong
suggestive evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, that the operational
changes that were made to the vaccination campaigns had a significant impact
on participation.
The first set of results may raise the question of whether the absence of any
positive statistical evidence suggest that the advertising interventions were in-
effective on their own. This may not necessarily be the case due to many
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contextual factors. To see how these contextual factors could have affected our
result, we compare our study to another related study by Cleaton et al., (2018).
In contrast to our results, Cleaton et al., (2018) found evidence of a posi-
tive effect of mobile phone text messaging in Haiti. A number of contextual
factors may explain this difference. Firstly, compared to the communes stud-
ied in Haiti (Gonaives and Saint-Marc), Morogoro rural district in Tanzania is
more sparsely populated. The need to travel long distances to reach vaccina-
tion stations meant that participants in our study area were more limited by
higher participation costs. Secondly, cultural factors or social norms may have
played a role. In both studies, routine advertising methods such as posters
and loudspeakers began one week before the vaccination day. Information had
therefore the same amount of time to reach community members. However,
Cleaton et al., (2018) reported that only about 15% of survey interviewees had
heard about the campaign from others. In our study, the corresponding figures
are much higher (more than 63% from household questionnaires and 50% from
vaccination station questionnaire, see Appendix, Tables 4.4 and 4.5). This
suggests that communication mechanisms and information sharing likely differ
between the two study areas. It is possible that our text recipients in our study
area could have easily been made aware of the vaccination campaigns through
other villagers or sources, making text messaging redundant rather than the
primary source of information like in Haiti. Based on these arguments, the
effect of text messaging was likely limited by some external impediment to
participation in the campaign itself or made redundant or hidden by the effect
of other information sources. In addition, it should be noted that routine ad-
vertising and word-of-mouth played a much more important role in spreading
information than the advertising interventions (based on vaccination station
surveys, more than 88% of the attendants had been made aware of the cam-
paigns through routine advertising and other villagers, the corresponding figure
from household questionnaires was more than 98% (not considering those who
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were not aware of the campaigns)). This does not suggest that the text mes-
saging was ineffective in raising awareness, but rather that its effect was largely
made redundant by routine advertising and word-of-mouth.
The effect of religious/tribal leaders, on the other hand, could have easily been
affected by the same contextual factors, which could also limit its observed
effect. There is no known study that looked at the effect of religious or tribal
leaders specifically in raising participation in rabies vaccination campaigns.
However, Le´chenne et al., (2016) showed evidence of a positive effect that
community leaders in general had on participation. Studies related to solving
vaccine hesitancy in other diseases (for example, Nasiru (2012) and Goldstein
(2015)) showed that religious and other political leaders could have a major in-
fluence in raising vaccination uptake. Our qualitative data also showed support
for religious/tribal leaders as a trusted source for communication. We therefore
argue that even though we do not observe any positive effect of religious/tribal
leaders on their own, it does not necessarily mean that it is ineffective, but
rather its affect was limited or made redundant by contextual factors.
Another possible reason why we observed no evidence for a positive effect
of each advertising intervention on its own might be because there was al-
ready sufficient information and motivation prior to the interventions being
implemented. Villagers could have been well-informed about the campaigns
even without being exposed to the advertising interventions. Rabies risk could
have already been sufficiently salient. Therefore, participation in vaccination
campaigns was likely limited by other factors rather than the effect of the ad-
vertising interventions. This may explain why we saw a much larger effect
of the operational changes than the advertising interventions because the key
reason behind low participation previously was due to difficulties accessing vac-
cination points, which was addressed with the operational changes.
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Our second set of results showed that operational changes to how the cam-
paigns were run could have a major impact on participation. Note however
that there was no known data on other village-level changes that could have
affected participation and the only known changes were the advertising inter-
ventions and the operational changes. Therefore, the interpretation of those
results had to be done cautiously.
However, these results are intuitive and there are many arguments and studies
to support them. The first change, stationing vaccination points at sub-village
level, lowered the direct participation cost incurred by the villagers, making
the vaccination point more accessible. Villagers did not have to walk too long
or spend too much time restraining their dogs. Beyenne et al., (2018) showed
distance to a dog rabies vaccination point has a significant impact on partici-
pation in Malawi. In a study by Bardosh et al., (2014), 16% of respondents to
their survey gave distance from vaccination point as the main reason for not
participating. This, combined with those who listed lack of awareness as main
reason for not participating, made up 39% of the respondents. We partially
addressed the problem of lack of awareness by starting to advertising the vac-
cination campaigns one week in advance so that more villagers had the time
to learn and inform each other about the campaigns. The other operational
change was opening the vaccination station all day long. This gave the villagers
more flexibility and more windows of opportunities to vaccinate their dogs. A
comprehensive study by Castillo-Neyra (2017) showed that similar changes,
that include similar small changes in the implementation of the vaccination
campaigns and timely advertising could have a positive effect on participation.
These results may also have a broader implication not only in terms of dis-
ease elimination, but also public good production in general, especially those
that require voluntary participation from community members. Our research
argued that although our advertising interventions could have been effective,
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their effect were limited or made redundant or both at least to some extent
by contextual factors. In addition, our operational changes which significantly
eased access for villagers seemed to have a major impact on participation.
These suggest that to design a cost-effective policy that deals with any col-
lective action problem a policy-maker needs to understand the context the
problem is in. In our case, our advertising interventions inform and make
the problem salient to community members, so that community members are
informed about the risk of rabies and the benefit of vaccination and rabies
elimination, and the operational changes eased access to the community mem-
bers so that their cost of participation in the collective action is sufficiently low.
One of the shortcomings in our research is that we were not able to isolate
the effect of advertising in general. This is because we bundled advance adver-
tising with the other two operational changes. This means that we were not
able to identify exactly what caused low participation in those villages prior to
our campaigns, whether it was because of lack of information and knowledge
or ineffective delivery of the vaccination campaign or both. Being able to iso-
late and identify each problem could have helped significantly in designing a
cost-effective policy which can target each specific problem individually.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Workshop Discussions:
List of topics discussed during workshop:
1. Discuss local experience with rabies and rabies vaccination campaigns.
2. Are there barriers to community members participating in rabies vacci-
nation campaigns? How can the vaccination campaigns be improved to
increase participation?
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3. We are planning to use mobile phone text messaging to advertise the
vaccination campaigns. Do you think it will be useful? What do you think
should be in the content of the text messages? (Ask participants for their
general opinion on the intervention and for any potential impediment to
the intervention.)
4. Do community members participate in collective action in different activ-
ities? (Discussant of the workshop should explain what collective action
is and provide examples and ensure that all participants understand what
collective action is before proceeding into detailed discussion).
4.6.2 Topic Guide for Focus Group Discussions
List of discussion topics discussed in Focus Group Discussions:
1. Are you familiar with rabies? Have there been cases of rabies in human
or dogs in the village recently? Do you think your village is at risk of a
rabies outbreak?
2. Do you think your participation in the vaccination campaigns can protect
you and your family from rabies?
3. Do you think your participation in the vaccination campaigns can help
eliminate rabies from your village?
4. Have there been dog vaccination campaigns in the village before? 1=Yes,
2=No
5. If yes, did many people in the village participate in the most recent
vaccination campaign?
6. What do you think stopped you or anyone else from participating in the
most recent vaccination campaign?
7. What do you think would have encouraged you or anyone else who did
not participate to participate in the vaccination campaigns?
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8. What do you think about the use of text messages to remind everyone
and encourage them to participate in the vaccination campaigns?
9. What type of content in the text message do you think would encourage
people to vaccinate in the vaccination campaigns? (Participants should
be given a list of messages (obtained from the workshops) and asked to
rank those messages)
4.6.3 Discussion topic in Community Leaders workshop
List of topics discussed in community leaders workshop
1. Explain the importance of collective action in eliminating rabies from the
local dog population. (Specifically, explain that for rabies to eliminated
we need to consistently achieve at least 70% coverage for a few consecutive
years. This requires collective action. Explain how in their position
as religious leaders who lead groups of followers, we believe they can
influence the decision of others to vaccinate their dogs. This can be
helpful in overcoming collective action problem and eliminate rabies.)
2. Communication with their respective religious/tribal communities:
• Do they have regular worship meetings?
• Are most of their followers active? (ie. Regularly attending meetings
and living by the standards prescribed by the religious leaders)
• Do they often meet with their followers outside the regular worship
meeting?
• Have other members of their respective religious groups sought ad-
vice from them regarding non-religious issues?
• Have you and your followers/congregation organised any collective
activities?
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• How hard is it for them to sensitise non-religious activities among
their followers?
3. If we are to ask them to help convince dog-owners in their religious groups
to participate in vaccination campaigns, how should this be done (from
their perspective)?
• When can this be done, during or outside religious meetings?
• Should this be done in groups or one-to-one?
• What kind of information would encourage their followers to partic-
ipate in vaccination campaigns? Can the information be portrayed
in the form of religious morality (conforming to their religious doc-
trines)?
4. Questions for tribal leaders:
• Do you think members of your tribe are at risk from rabies?
• Do pastoralist communities generally face difficulties attending ca-
nine rabies vaccination campaigns? If so, what are the difficulties
and what can be done to overcome the difficulties?
• If we are to send text messages to remind the pastoralist commu-
nities to vaccinate their dogs, would this be helpful? (also discuss
literacy rate)
• In your position, as a tribal leader, is there anything you can do to
encourage your tribe members to vaccinate their dogs?
4.6.4 Village-Level Questionnaire
List of questions asked in village-level questionnaire (administered to village-
leaders (chairman or executive)):
1. Is there a hospital or health centre in your village?
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• Yes
• No
2. If not, how long does it take to reach the nearest hospital or health centre?
• Less than 2 hours
• 2 to 4 hours
• 4 to 6 hours
• More than 6 hours
3. If not, is there access to public transport from your village to the nearest
hospital or health centre?
• Yes
• No
4. Are there qualified veterinarians in your village?
• Yes
• No
5. Is there regular presence of Livestock Field Officers in your village?
• Yes
• No
6. Please rank the following income-generating activities in order of impor-
tance to your village (1 - most important to 3 - least important):
• .......Agriculture (crops)
• .......Agriculture (Livestock)
• .......Commercial activity (Including trading in agricultural prod-
ucts)
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7. Is there any other income-generating activity that we should take note
of?
8. Do most households in your village own mobile phones?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• All household
9. Is there permanent mobile phone signal coverage in your village?
• Yes
• No
10. Do most households have access to basic needs such as clean water and
energy?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• All household
11. Do most villagers have to collect water for their daily usage?
• Yes
• No
12. If yes, how long does it take for most of them to collect water? (From
time leaving to arriving back home)
• Less than one hour
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• Between one to two hours
• More than two hours
13. What is the proportion of the villagers that live 10 minutes’ walk from
the village center?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• All household
14. How many people in your village have completed standard 7? (Education)
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• All household
15. What is the religious composition in your village?
• There are more Christians than Muslims
• There are more Muslims and Christians
• They are equally divided
16. Are most of them active in their respective religious practices?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
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• All household
17. Are there pastoralist communities in or nearby to your village?
• Yes
• No
18. If yes, how far do they typically live from the village centre?
• Less than 10-minutes’ walk away
• Less than 1-hour’s walk away
• More than 1-hour’s walk away
19. How many of the dogs in your village are owned by the pastoralist com-
munities?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• All dogs
20. Is there easy road access to the residence of the pastoralist communities?
• Yes
• No
21. Are the pastoralist communities usually involved in village community
activities?
• Yes
• No
22. Do pastoralists usually come into contact with the rest of the community
in the village?
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• Yes
• No
23. What is the population of dog-owning households in your village?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• All household
24. In your village, what do people usually do to a dog that bit someone?
(select multiple if necessary)
• Kill the dog
• Restrain the dog
• Chase the dog away
• Other, specify .......
25. According to village custom, if a dog bites someone in your village, does
the owner of the dog have to pay for post-exposure prophylaxis to the
victims?
• Yes
• No
26. If yes, how often is it successfully enforced?
• Never
• Less than half the time
• Around half the time
• More than half the time
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• Always
27. What is the dog population in your village?
• Less than 20
• 21 to 50
• 51 to 100
• 101 to 200
• More than 200
28. How do dog-owners generally treat their dogs?
• As family pet
• As guard dogs (for home)
• As guard dogs (for crops and livestock)
• Left to free-roam
29. Have there been canine rabies vaccination campaigns in your village be-
fore?
• Yes
• No
30. If yes, please provide the month and year of the most recent vaccination
campaign.
31. If yes, did many dog-owners participate in the most recent vaccination
campaign?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
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• All household
32. If yes, how were the vaccination campaigns advertised (select multiple if
necessary):
• Loudspeakers
• Radio/television
• Mobile phone text messaging
• Posters
• Other, specify.....
33. If yes, where did the vaccination campaign take place? (select multiple
if necessary)
• Local school
• Local hospital
• Town hall
• Other, specify.....
34. Do you think there could have been a better location for the vaccination
campaign?
• Yes
• No
35. If yes, where do you suggest the next vaccination campaign should take
place?
• Local school
• Local hospital
• Town hall
• Other, specify.....
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4.6.5 Household Questionnaire
Questions asked in household questionnaire:
Information about Interviewee:
Name:................................ Age:........ Gender:.......... Phone number:..........
Head of Household: Yes/No
If not, what is the name of the head of the household?......................................
If not, role in the household: .............................................................
Head of household’s occupation:
• Farmer (crops)
• Farmer (livestock)
• Businessperson
• Civil servant
• Other ............
Household Information
1. Are there children in your household?
• Yes
• No
2. If yes, how many children are in your household?
• Aged 5 or less ...........
• Aged 6 to 12 .............
• Aged 13 to 17 ............
3. How many adults (aged 18 or above) are in this household?..........
4. Do all children aged between 7 and 15 years old go to school?
• None of them goes to school
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• Only some go to school
• All of them go to school
5. Do those aged above 13 years old have at least completed standard 7?
• None has completed
• Only some have completed
• All of them have completed
6. Has there been a child death in the household in the last 5 years?
• Yes
• No
• There are no children in the household
7. Has there been a child death to a woman of age 35 or less?
• Yes
• No
• There has been no child birth in the household
8. Does the household have access to electricity?
• Yes
• No
9. If yes, what is the main source of your electricity?
• Battery
• Solar
• Publically provided electricity
• Other,specify .....................
10. What is the household’s source of drinking water?
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• Piped water, public tap
• Protected dug/tube well/spring or rainwater collection
• Unprotected well/spring or surface water (rivers, ponds, lakes, streams,
dams)
• Water provided by carts or tanker trucks
• Other, specify ....................
11. If safe drinking water must be collected, how long does it take to collect
the water?
• Less than 30 minutes’ walk round-trip
• At least 30 minutes’ walk round-trip
12. What type of lavatory is used in the household?
• Flush/pour flush toilets or latrines connected to a sewer, septic tank
or pit
• Pit latrines (Ventilated or with a slab or platform that covers the
pit)
• Composting toilets
• Public or shared facilities (of any type)
• Toilets which discharge directly into open sewer or ditch
• Pit latrines without slab
• Other, specify ..................
13. What type of fuel does the household use for cooking?
• Gas or Kerosene
• Dung or wood
• Charcoal
• Other, specify ..................
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14. What is the flooring material of the dwelling?
• Dirt, sand or dung
• Wood or concrete
• No finished flooring
• Other, specify..................
15. Does the household own any device for access to external information?
Choose all that apply:
• Radio
• Television
• Telephone or Mobile phone
• Other, specify ...................
• None
16. Does the household own any form of private transportation? Choose all
that apply:
• Bicycle/Animal Cart
• Motorbike
• Car/Truck
• Motorboat
• Other, specify .................
• None
17. If you own automated vehicles, is any of them used as direct means of
generating income? For example, as taxi or taxi motorbike, etc.
• Yes
• No
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18. Does the household own a refrigerator?
• Yes
• No
19. Does the household own any agricultural land?
• Yes
• No
20. Does the household own any livestock? Choose all that apply:
• At least 1 horse or cattle
• At least 2 goats or sheep
• At least 10 Chicken
• Other, specify (include amount) ......................
• None
21. Please rank the following items in order of importance to you when choos-
ing your daily activities (1 - Most important to 5 - Least important):
• .....Meeting the basic short-term or current needs of the family mem-
bers.
• .....Keeping the family healthy.
• .....Ensuring that the children meet their educational needs.
• .....Saving up as protection against future difficulties (e.g. protection
against future illness, job loss or natural disasters, etc.)
• .....Saving up for future needs (e.g. save for children’s education or
wedding, for a big purchase, etc.)
About dogs within household
1. Do you own dogs?
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• Yes
• No
2. Reasons for owning dogs, choose all that apply:
• As pet
• As guide dogs
• As guard dogs for crops
• As guard dogs for livestock
• Other, specify:............
3. If own dogs, how many dogs do you own?
• Less than 3 months old ............
• More than 3 months old ............
4. How many of these dogs were vaccinated against rabies in the most recent
vaccination campaign?
• Less than 3 months old ............
• More than 3 months old ............
5. If not all dogs were vaccinated, why not?
• Those that were not vaccinated in the recent campaign have been
vaccinated already
• Unable to bring all of them to the vaccination point at once
• Unable to find all of them on that day
6. If you participated in the most recent vaccination campaign, did you incur
any costs?
• Costs of transport...................
• Cost of vaccination (per dog) .......
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• Total ...............................
7. How did you become aware of the vaccination campaigns taking place?
• Mobile phone text messaging
• Religious or tribal leaders
• Village or sub-village leaders
• Other villagers
• Posters or loudspeakers
• Other, specify......................
8. If you participated in the previous vaccination campaign, how long did
it take for the whole process to be completed? (From leaving home to
arriving back home)
• Less than 1 hour
• 1 to 2 hours
• 2 to 4 hours
• More than 4 hours
9. If you did not participate in the most recent vaccination campaign, why
not?
• No knowledge of the campaign
• Too Busy
• Do not believe in the benefits of vaccination
• Believe that the vaccine can harm the dogs
• Other, specify ...................
10. Please tell us who in your household look after the dogs, decide whether
to vaccinate them, and would bring them to the vaccination point, by
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giving us their position in the household (eg, household head, children,
etc) and their age.
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices towards Rabies
1. Do you know what rabies is?
• Yes
• No
2. If Yes, how did you first learn about rabies?
• Personal experience with the disease
• Media
• By word of mouth
• Previous vaccination campaigns in the village
• Other, specify ....................
3. Do you have family members or friends who have been bitten by rabid
dogs before?
• Yes
• No
4. If yes, please tell us their relation to you, whether they received PEP, the
cost of PEP, the number of trips it took to complete the PEP, travel cost
and total cost.
5. Do you have family members or relatives who died from rabies?
• Yes
• No
6. If yes, tell us their relation to you, the name of the village they were from
and the year in which they died.
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7. Have you heard of other cases of rabies in human before?
• Yes
• No
8. If yes, tell us the name of the village and the year of the case.
9. Do you think that it is important to vaccinate your dogs against rabies?
10. If yes, why? (choose all that apply)
• It protects my dogs from rabies
• It protects my family from rabies
• It contributes to the elimination of rabies in my village
• Other, specify ...................
11. If no, why not? (choose all that apply)
• The vaccine is ineffective in protecting my dogs and it causes other
problems for them
• Even if I vaccinate my dogs, my family is still not completely pro-
tected from rabies
• Vaccinating is useless because my neighbours are not vaccinating
anyway
• Other, specify .....................
12. Do you think that vaccinating your dogs can protect your family from
rabies?
• 1. It will completely protect my family from rabies
• It will protect my family from rabies to some extent only
• It will not protect my family from rabies
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13. How much do you think you or your family members are at risk from
rabies?
• No risk
• Low risk
• Medium risk
• High risk
• Very high risk
14. Do you think most of your neighbours (other dog owners) participated in
the vaccination campaigns?
• Yes
• No
• Only some
15. If not or only some, why do you think some of your neighbours did not
participating in the recent vaccination campaign?
• No knowledge of the campaign
• Too Busy
• Do not believe in the benefits of vaccination
• Believe that the vaccination can harm the dogs
• Other, specify ...............................
16. How many people in the village do you think participated in the recent
vaccination campaign?
• None
• Less than half
• Half
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• More than half
• Everyone
17. How likely do you think that a child in your village will get bitten by a
rabid dog in the next month?
• Unlikely
• Moderately likely
• Very likely
18. How likely do you think that a child in your village will get bitten by a
rabid dog in the next six months?
• Unlikely
• Moderately likely
• Very likely
19. How likely do you think that a child in your village will get bitten by a
rabid dog in the next year?
• Unlikely
• Moderately likely
• Very likely
20. If you and all your neighbors participate in dog vaccination campaigns,
how likely do you think that children in your village will be protected
from being bitten by a rabid dog?
• Unlikely
• Moderately likely
• Very likely
21. What proportion of your community is likely to participate in a dog
vaccination campaign?
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• Too few to make a difference to whether or not a child gets bitten
by a rabid dog
• Enough to substantially lower the likelihood of a child getting bitten
by a rabid dog
22. What difference would your participation in the dog vaccination cam-
paigns make to whether or not a child gets bitten by a rabid dog?
• Some difference but not enough to prevent a child from being bitten
by a rabid dog
• My participation is essential to prevent a child from being bitten by
a rabid dog
• So many other community members participate in dog vaccination
campaigns that my participation isn’t essential
General Collective Action-related questions
1. Please select the following activities that you think require collective par-
ticipation from other villagers to be successful:
• The construction of a new dispensary/school/village headquarter,
etc.
• Keeping our children healthy through collectively taking preventa-
tive measures
• Keeping our source of drinking water clean
• Eliminating infectious diseases
2. Suppose your village require a new village dispensary, would you be will-
ing to participate in building the dispensary?
• Yes
• No
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3. If yes, in what capacity?
• Contributing cash
• Contributing physical labour and other skills
• Both
4. If not, why not?
• I do not see why the village needs a new dispensary
• Other people will not participate, so my contribution will be in vain
• Many other people will be contributing already, the dispensary will
be built regardless of whether I contribute or not.
5. What proportion of your community is likely to participate in such ac-
tivity as building a dispensary?
• Too few for it to be successful
• Enough for it to be successful
• Too many for my participation to be necessary
6. What proportion of your community would contribute through cash only?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• Everyone
7. What proportion of your community will contribute through physical
labour and other skills only?
• None
• Less than half
132
• Around half
• More than half
• Everyone
8. What proportion of your community will contribute through both cash
and physical labour and other skills?
• None
• Less than half
• Around half
• More than half
• Everyone
9. How significant do you think your participation is to the success of such
project?
• My participation is not enough to ensure the success of the project
• My participation is essential to the success of the project
• Many other people are participating already that my participation
is not so essential
10. Do you think you can rely on your fellow villagers to complete such
project?
• If I want such project completed, I need to actively participate my-
self
• If I want such project completed, I need not only to actively partic-
ipate, but also to mobilize other villagers
• I can completely rely on them to complete the project, even without
my participation
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General Measure of Locus of Control (selection from Rotter, 1966)
Of the pairs of statements below, please select one statement you most agree
with:
1. • Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad
luck.
• People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
2. • I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
• Trusting in fate has never turned out as well for me as making a
decision to take a definite course of action.
3. • Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at
the right time.
• Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has nothing or
little to do with it.
4. • It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn
out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
• When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
5. • Many times, we might as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
• In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
6. • Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are con-
trolled by accidental happenings
• There really is no such thing as “luck”.
7. • In the long run, the bad things that happen to us are balanced by
the good ones.
• Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness
or all three.
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8. • Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that
happen to me.
• It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an im-
portant role in my life.
9. • Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction
my life is taking.
• What happens to me is my own doing.
Health Measure Locus of Control
1. If I am going to be sick, I will get sick regardless of what I do.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
2. Taking preventative measures, such as vaccinating, can keep me and my
family healthy.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
3. My good health is a largely a matter of good fortune.
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• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
4. Even when I take care of myself, it’s easy to get sick.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
5. Even if I try to protect my health, I still get sick if others around me do
not protect themselves.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
6. When I don’t feel well, health professionals can always help me.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
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• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
7. To improve my family’s happiness, I need to prioritize the health of my
family.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
8. There is nothing I can do to protect myself and my family from rabies.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
9. Vaccinating my dogs against rabies does not protect my family members
from rabies.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
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• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
10. My family is protected against rabies only if many people in the village
vaccinate their dogs against rabies.
• Strongly disagree
• Moderately disagree
• Disagree
• Agree
• Moderately agree
• Strongly agree
Intervention-related questions
1. Does at least one member of the household own a mobile phone?
• Yes
• No
2. How often do you check your phone for text messages?
• Texts are read as soon as notification is received
• Daily
• Weekly
• Other................................times/week
3. Have you ever received information about community-based activities
through text messaging?
• Yes
• No
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4. Have you ever received information about commercial deals through text
messaging?
• Yes
• No
5. Do you normally pay attention to all information you receive through
text messaging?
• Yes
• No
• Only some
6. If only some, what type of information do you pay attention to? Choose
all that apply:
• Community-based activities
• Commercial deals
• Texts from mobile phone companies
• Job opportunities
• Other.............................
7. What do you use your mobile phone for? Choose all that apply:
• Communication through phone calls and text messaging
• Social media
• Mobile banking
• Other.......................
8. For the type of information that you pay attention to, on a scale from 1
to 10, how much do you trust the information you receive through text
messages? ......... (1 - I do not trust any information in the text messages,
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10 - I trust that the information in the text messages are completely
accurate).
9. What is the main religion of this household?
• Christianity
• Muslim
• Traditional Religions
• Other .....................
10. Do you regularly attend religious meetings?
• Yes
• No
11. Do you usually seek advice from your religious leaders?
• Yes
• No
12. If Yes, what kind of advice do you seek from them? Choose all that
apply:
• Health advice
• Financial advice
• Spiritual advice
• Children education
• Other.....................
13. On a scale from 1 to 10, how much does the opinion or advice of your
religious leader influence your action?..................................... (1 – their
opinion/advice is not part of my consideration, 10 – I follow whatever
they advise)
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4.6.6 Tables Summarising the Number of Interviewees
Exposed to Different Information Sources
Table 4.4: Number of interviewees exposed to different advertising methods
based on household questionnaire
Table 4.5: Number of interviewees exposed to different advertising methods
based on vaccination point questionnaire
4.6.7 Cash Experiment
The design of the cash experiment was as follows. 20 participants in each vil-
lage were selected to represent their respective villages. Each participant was
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given 5,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) (equivalent to approximately 1.68 GBP
at the time of the experiment). They were then given the choice to either
keep the 5,000 TZS (not participate in “collective action”) or return it (par-
ticipate in “collective action”). If at least 14 of the participants in the same
village return the 5,000 TZS then all participants in that village receive 20,000
TZS, regardless of whether they returned the 5,000 TZS in the first place or
not. Specifically, participants who returned the 5,000 TZS would end up with
20,000 TZS if at least 13 other participants in the village also return the 5,000
TZS cash, and those who did not return the cash would end up with 25,000
TZS. If less than 14 of the participants in the village returned the cash, then
those who returned the cash would end up with nothing, while those who did
not return the cash could keep the 5,000 TZS. Each village’s measurement of its
willingness to participate in collective action is the fraction of participants that
returned the 5,000 TZS cash. A village is described as successful in the cash
experiment if 14 participants return the cash, or fail otherwise. The amount
of cash used was consulted with local researchers and was deemed appropriate
and sufficient for the purpose of the experiment.
On the day of the administration of the household questionnaires and the cash
experiment, a team of two interviewers were asked to administer the household
questionnaires and the cash experiment in each village. Each interviewer visited
10 households individually accompanied by a village leader (or his/her repre-
sentative) whose role was to observe the interviewing process and to introduce
the research team to the households. Before administering the questionnaires,
participants were given full information about the household questionnaire and
the cash experiment. Only those who agreed to participate in both activities
were allowed to participate. Those who did not agree to either of the two activ-
ities or both, were not allowed to participate. However, those who had agreed
to participate, but then changed their mind, were allowed to withdraw if they
wished to.
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Figure 4.4: Number of villages suc-
ceeding or failing in the cash experi-
ment
Figure 4.5: Number of villages by num-
ber of participants returning the 5,000
TZS cash
At the interviews, the order of the activities were as follows. After being briefed
and agreeing to participate in the activities, the participants were given 5,000
TZS in cash. Following this, the participants completed the household ques-
tionnaires and were then given a few minutes to decide whether they wished
to return the cash or not to the interviewer.
After each interview is completed, the interviewers moved to the next ran-
domly selected households until they had collected data from 20 households in
a village. The interviewers then summed up the number of participants who
returned the cash. If at least 14 participants returned the cash, then the inter-
viewers would revisit the respective households that they interviewed with the
20,000 TZS cash on the same day, immediately after the activities concluded.
If less than 14 participants returned the cash, the interviewers would phone
or text each household informing them that they would not be receiving the
20,000 TZS. Figure 4.4 shows that only three villages were successful in the
cash experiment. Two of those villages had 15 participants returning the 5,000
TZS cash and the other village had 16. Figure 4.5 sorts the villages by the
number of participants returning the cash. Most of the villages (31) had be-
tween six to ten participants returning the cash. The next smaller group (13
villages) is those with one to five participants returning the cash, followed by
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot: Number of participants and vaccination coverage
the group with eleven to fifteen (11 villages, of which only two were successful).
Only one village had 16 participants returning the cash.
Since we used the result of the cash experiment as a proxy for a village’s
underlying willingness to participate in rabies vaccination campaigns, we made
a comparison between the result of the experiment and vaccination coverage,
which is a proxy for participation. Figure 4.6 shows a scatter plot between
the number of participants returning the cash and vaccination coverage. Each
data point on the scatter plot represents a village. The fitted line shows a neg-
ative but insignificant relationship. This suggests that there is no noticeable
correlation between the number of participants returning the cash in the cash
experiment and vaccination coverage.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, the key objective was to design policies that can help increase
participation in rabies vaccination campaigns. In trying to understand the
cause for the lack of participation in rabies vaccination campaigns, I looked
at this problem as a public good production problem. Therefore, I started
by studying two different public good production games. Results from these
models indicated that effective policies need to be able to overcome collective
action problem and effective policies may vary between different public goods
with different structural factors (in Chapter 3, I looked at the shape of the
public good’s production as a structural factor). I then discussed a field ex-
periment which tested the effect of two advertising interventions, the use of
mobile phone text messaging and religious/tribal leaders, in raising participa-
tion in rabies vaccination campaigns. There was no evidence that each of the
interventions on their own were effective in raising participation in the vacci-
nation campaigns, but there was evidence that the interventions had a positive
effect when used together. There was also some suggestive evidence that mea-
sures that were used to ease participation in the vaccination campaigns could
have a significant and positive impact.
There are several lessons to be learned in the context of rabies control in Tan-
zania and in the context of the general public good production problem. In
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the context of rabies control in Tanzania, we learned that the key impediment
to participation in rabies vaccination campaigns in Tanzania is the cost of par-
ticipation incurred by participants. This could be seen in the results of the
field experiment which suggested that advertising interventions may have had
a much smaller impact on participation than operational changes eased partic-
ipation of the villagers. This suggests that an effective vaccination campaigns
should make it less costly for villagers to participate. However, this recommen-
dation may differ for other parts of the world, which face different reasons for
low participation.
In the context of the general public good production, this study suggests that
context matters in policy-design. There can be different underlying reasons
for the failure to produce a public good. These include, for example, the lack
of awareness, the inability of a community to coordinate in collective action
or both. The first step that a policy-maker should take in policy-design is to
identify all underlying reasons behind any low participation in public good pro-
duction. The second step would be to design a set of policies which are tailored
to address those problems and the structural factors of the public good.
There are several weaknesses that should be mentioned in this study. Firstly,
although the theoretical models in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide
some useful insights, they are quite simple and they did not capture some of
the structural factors of public goods that are relevant in rabies control in Tan-
zania. Secondly, reliable village-level data was lacking in the field experiment.
This meant that the identification of the effect of the interventions could have
been improved if we had data on village-level variables that could be used as
control variables. The lack of village-level data also meant that we could at
most obtain a suggestive instead of a conclusive evidence of the effect of the
operational changes. This leads to the third weakness, which was that the de-
sign of the experiment was not able to overcome problems associated with the
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lack of village-level variables. A difference-in-difference experimental design
would have been a much better design that would not require access to the
village-level variables, but the design would have required more time and other
resources.
These weaknesses mean that the theoretical models and the field experiment
should be explored even further. The theoretical models could be extended
to take into account more structural factors (discussed in Chapter 3) that
could impact participation in public good production. This can further help
in the understanding of specific public goods and in the design of policies that
can be tailored for each type of public goods. In terms of the field experi-
ment, further improvements could be made to the design of the experiment to
better isolate the effect of the interventions we were interested in. Firstly, a
difference-in-difference experimental design could have improved the results of
the experiment as discussed above. Otherwise, additional reliable dataset on
key village-level variables are needed. The effect of the operational changes and
other related measures should be studied under a clearer framework so that a
more conclusive evidence could be obtained.
As discussed throughout this thesis, public good production is crucial in im-
proving the livelihood of many, especially in marginalised communities. This
thesis has tried to understand some underlying reasons behind why there is low
voluntary participation in public good production and it has provided some
useful insights in terms of policy-design. There are many more factors that
influence the success of public good production and have not been explored by
this thesis, nor by the larger literature. It is encouraged that more effort should
be put into studying driving factors that influence the production of different
types of public good so that there is a deeper understanding in what drives the
success of public good production and how to design effective policies that are
tailored for each types of public good.
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